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A Snapshot of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

A Snapshot of the
Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act
Mike Koehler*

*

Mike Koehler is an Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law. Professor
Koehler is the founder and editor of the website FCPA Professor (www.fcpaprofessor.com) and
author of the book “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in a New Era” (Edward Elgar Publishers,
2014). Professor Koehler’s FCPA expertise and views are informed by a decade of legal practice
experience at a leading international law firm. The issues covered in this article, current as of
January 1, 2015, assume the reader has sufficient knowledge and understanding of the FCPA, as
well as FCPA enforcement, including the role of the Department of Justice and Securities and
Exchange Commission in enforcing the FCPA and the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve
FCPA scrutiny. Interested readers can learn more about these topics, and others, by reading Mike
Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705517. The author’s FCPA Professor website
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com) is also a useful resource for general FCPA information, specifically
the FCPA 101 page of the site (http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101).
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This article, part of an annual series, provides a snapshot of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (“FCPA”) and related developments from 2014 and will be of value to
anyone who seeks an informed base of knowledge regarding the FCPA and related
legal and policy issues. Specifically, this article uses FCPA enforcement action data
and other top FCPA or related developments to highlight noteworthy issues from
2014 such as: numerous enforcement statistics; the wide spectrum of FCPA
enforcement actions; the gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement;
the problematic surge in SEC administrative actions to resolve alleged instances of
FCPA scrutiny; and judicial scrutiny of FCPA and related enforcement theories.

Introduction
This article, part of an annual series, provides a snapshot of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and related developments from 2014 and will be of value to anyone
who seeks an informed based of knowledge regarding the FCPA and related legal
and policy issues. Although this article is primarily about the FCPA and its
enforcement, reference is also made to other notable non-FCPA developments in
2014 to best appreciate the many controversial aspects of FCPA enforcement.
Part I of this article highlights various FCPA enforcement statistics — both
corporate and individual enforcement actions — from 2014 and places the statistics
in the proper historical perspective.
Part II of this article uses FCPA enforcement action data to highlight noteworthy
issues from 2014. Specifically, the following issues are discussed: (i) the wide
spectrum of FCPA allegations — from multi-million dollar payments in connection
with large infrastructure projects to $4 payments — and how the breadth of such
allegations send confusing compliance messages to those subject to the FCPA; (ii)
the wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement and a relevant
data point that helps explain the gap as well as the significant policy issues which
flow from the gap; and (iii) the problematic surge in SEC administrative actions to
resolve alleged instances of FCPA scrutiny.
Part III of this article highlights other top FCPA or related developments from
2014. Specifically, the following issues are discussed: (i) judicial scrutiny of FCPA
enforcement agency theories, including the first case of precedent regarding the
FCPA’s important “foreign official” element; and (ii) judicial scrutiny of enforcement
theories related to FCPA enforcement and how non-FCPA legal developments
should cause pause as to certain FCPA enforcement theories.

I. 2014 FCPA Enforcement Overview
Part I of this article highlights various FCPA enforcement statistics — both
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corporate and individual enforcement actions — from 2014 and places the statistics
in the proper historical perspective.
A. DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement
As demonstrated in Table I, the DOJ collected approximately $1.25 billion in
settlement amounts in seven corporate FCPA enforcement actions1 in 2014.
Table I — 2014 DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Company
Alstom
Entities5

Fine
$772.3
million

Resolution
Vehicle2
Plea / Plea / DPA /
DPA6

Origin3
Foreign Law
Enforcement

Related Individual
Action4
Yes (as to a portion of
the alleged conduct)8

Investigation7

1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

Corporate FCPA enforcement statistics in this article use the “core” approach. The core approach
focuses on unique instances of corporate conduct regardless of whether the conduct at issue involves
a DOJ or SEC enforcement action or both (as is frequently the case), regardless of whether the
corporate enforcement action involves a parent company, a subsidiary or both (as is frequently the
case), and regardless of whether the DOJ and/or SEC bring any related individual enforcement
actions (as is occasionally the case). For additional information on this method of quantifying FCPA
enforcement, see What is an FCPA Enforcement Action?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 7, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/what-is-an-fcpa-enforcement-action. This method of computing
FCPA statistics is consistent with the DOJ’s approach. See Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-72 (quoting DOJ’s FCPA Unit
Chief). This approach is also a commonly accepted method used by other scholars in other
areas. See, e.g., Michael Klausner & Jason Hegland, SEC Practice In Targeting and Penalizing
Individual Defendants, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION
(Sept. 3, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/09/03/sec-practice-in-targeting-andpenalizing-individual-defendants/.
DPA refers to a deferred prosecution agreement and NPA refers to a non-prosecution
agreement. To learn more about these agreements in the FCPA context, see Mike Koehler, The
Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705517.
Refers to the event or events which initially prompted the scrutiny that resulted in the FCPA
enforcement action. See id. at 911.
Refers to employees of the corporate entity resolving the FCPA enforcement action. See Koehler,
supra note 3, at 924-25.
Press Release, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve
Foreign Bribery Charges, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-bribery
(last
updated Dec. 29, 2014).
Id. The enforcement action involved a criminal information against Alstom S.A. resolved via a
plea agreement; a criminal information against Alstom Network Schweiz AG resolved via a plea
agreement; a criminal information against Alstom Power Inc. resolved via a DPA; and a
criminal information against Alstom Grid Inc. resolved via a DPA.
Issues to Consider From the Alstom Action, FCPA Professor (Jan. 2, 2015),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/issues-to-consider-from-the-alstom-action.
The Alstom enforcement action alleged conduct in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the
Bahamas, and Taiwan. The Indonesia conduct also served as the basis for several individual
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Company

Fine

Resolution
Vehicle2

Origin3

Related Individual
Action4

Avon
Entities9

$67.6 million

Plea / DPA

Voluntary
Disclosure

No

Dallas
Airmotive

$14 million

DPA

Related
Investigation11

No

$14.4 million

NPA

Voluntary

No

Inc.10
Bio-Rad
Laboratorie
s, Inc.12
HewlettPackard
Co.
Entities13

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.
14.
15.
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Disclosure
$76.7 million

Plea / DPA / NPA14

Foreign
Law
Enforcement

No

Investigation15

enforcement actions. See, Current and Former Alstom Employees Charged in Connection With
Payments in Indonesia, FCPA Professor (April 24, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
current-and-former-alstom-employees-charged-in-connection-with-payments-in-indonesia.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Avon China Pleads Guilty to Violating the FCPA By Concealing
$8 Million In Gifts To Chinese Officials (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/avon-chinapleads-guilty-violating-fcpa-concealing-more-8-million-gifts-chinese-officials (last updated Dec. 18,
2014).
Press Release, Dallas Airmotive Inc. Admits Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Volations and Agrees to
Pay $14 Million Criminal Penalty, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/dallas-airmotive-inc-admits-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-violationsand-agrees-pay-14 (last updated Dec. 10, 2014).
The enforcement action is believed to be causally related to prior FCPA enforcement actions
against other aircraft maintenance companies. See Dallas Airmotive Inc., the Latest Aircraft
Maintenance Company to Resolve a FCPA Enforcement Action, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 12,
2014),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/dallas-airmotive-inc-the-latest-aircraft-maintenancecompany-to-resolve-an-fcpa-enforcement-action.
Press Release, Bio-Rad Laboratories Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and
Agrees to Pay $14.35 Million Penalty, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/bio-rad-laboratories-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay1435 (last updated Nov. 4, 2014).
Press Release, Hewlett-Packard Russia Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, (April 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-russia-agrees-pleadguilty-foreign-bribery (last updated Dec. 16, 2014).
The enforcement action involved a criminal information against HP Russia resolved via a plea
agreement; a criminal information against HP Poland resolved via a DPA; and an NPA with
HP Mexico.
The enforcement action appears to have been the result of a previous German and Russian law
enforcement investigation.
See H-P Under Scrutiny, FCPA PROFESSOR (April 16,
2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/h-p-under-scrutiny.
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Company

Fine

Resolution
Vehicle2

Origin3

Related Individual
Action4

Marubeni
Corp.16

$88 million

Plea

Related
Investigation17

No

Alcoa
World

$209 million19

Plea

Related
Civil
Lawsuit20

No

Alumina
LLC18
TOTAL

$1.25 billion

B. SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement
As demonstrated in Table II, in seven corporate FCPA enforcement actions in
2014 the SEC collected approximately $327 million in settlement amounts.
Table II — 2013 SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Company

Avon21

16.

17.

18.

19.
20.

21.

Settlement

Resolution

Amount

Vehicle

$67.4 million

Settled Civil
Complaint

Origin

Related
Individual
Action

Voluntary
Disclosure

No

Press Release, Marubeni Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and to Pay
An $88 Million Dollar Fine, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (March 19, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/marubeni-corporation-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery-chargesand-pay-88-million-fine (last updated Sept. 15, 2014).
The enforcement action was related to the April 2013 FCPA enforcement action against various
current and former employees of Alstom. See Current And Former Alstom Employees Charged In
Connection With Payments In Indonesia, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/current-and-former-alstom-employees-charged-in-connection-withpayments-in-indonesia.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alcoa World Alumina Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery
and Pay $223 Million in Fines and Forfeiture (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alcoaworld-alumina-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery-and-pay-223-million-fines-and (last updated
Sept. 15, 2014).
Id. In addition, the company agreed to pay an administrative forfeiture of $14 million.
See Alan Katz, Alcoa Pays $384 Million to Resolve Bahrain-Bribery Probe, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan.
9, 2014, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-09/alcoa-pays-384-million-toresolve-foreign-bribery-probe. The enforcement action resulted from a 2008 civil lawsuit between
Alba and Alcoa.
Press Release, SEC Charges Avon With FCPA Violations, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 17,
2014), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-285.html#.VJOLUV4CB.
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Company

Settlement
Amount

Resolution
Vehicle

Origin

Related
Individual
Action

Bruker

$2.4 million

Corp.22
Bio-Rad
Laboratories
, Inc.23
Layne

$40.7 million

$5.1 million

Christensen
Co.24
Smith &
Wesson

$2 million

Corp.25
HewlettPackard
Co.27

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
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$34 million

Administrative

Voluntary

Cease and Desist
Order

Disclosure

Administrative
Cease and Desist

Voluntary
Disclosure

No

Order
Administrative

Voluntary

No

Cease and Desist
Order

Disclosure

Administrative
Cease and Desist

Related
Individual

Order

Enforcement
Action26

Administrative
Cease and Desist

Foreign Law
Enforcement

Order

Investigatio
n28

No

No

No

Press Release, SEC Charges Massachusetts-Based Scientific Instruments Manufacturer with FCPA
Violations,
U.S.
SEC.
AND
EXCH.
COMM’N
(Dec.
15,
2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543708934#.VI9cnyvF91Y.
Press Release, SEC Charges California-Based Bio-Rad Laboratories With FCPA Violations, U.S.
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1370543347364#.VGK-ifnF91Z.
Press Release, SEC Charges Texas-Based Layne Christensen Company With FCPA Violations, U.S.
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1370543291857#.VGK_BfnF91Z.
Press Release, SEC Charges Smith & Wesson With FCPA Violations, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N
(Jun.
28,
2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/
1370542384677#.VGK_1_nF91Z.
See Stung By The Sting – Smith & Wesson Resolves FCPA Scrutiny That Originated With The Africa
Sting, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jul. 29 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/stung-by-the-sting-smithwesson-resolves-fcpa-scrutiny-that-originated-with-the-africa-sting.
The enforcement action
originated after a Smith & Wesson employee was criminally charged in the DOJ’s manufactured
Africa Sting enforcement action.
Press Release, SEC Charges Hewlett-Packard With FCPA Violations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr.
9,
2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541453075#.
VGLAYvnF91Y.
Koehler, supra note 16. The enforcement action appears to have been the result of a previous
German and Russian law enforcement investigation.
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Company

Settlement
Amount

Resolution
Vehicle

Origin

Related
Individual
Action

Alcoa

Inc.29

TOTAL

$175

million30

Administrative

Related

Cease and Desist
Order

Civil
Lawsuit31

No

$327 million

Analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data separately in Tables I and II is
useful and informative given that the DOJ and SEC are separate law enforcement
agencies and different issues may arise in DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement
actions.32 On the other hand, analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data in
the aggregate is also useful and informative in that it provides a more holistic view
of FCPA enforcement.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Press Release, SEC Charges Alcoa With FCPA Violations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540596936#.VGLA6fnF91Y.
See, id. $14 million of this amount was deemed satisfied by the payment of the forfeiture in the
related DOJ action.
See, Katz, supra note 21. The enforcement action resulted from a 2008 civil lawsuit between Alba
and Alcoa.
See, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of
Justice and the Enf’t Div. of the U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf. As evident from Tables I and II, there is
substantial overlap between the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement programs. FCPA enforcement
actions against issuers typically involve related and coordinated enforcement actions by the DOJ
for criminal FCPA violations (whether anti-bribery violations or books and records and internal
control violations) and by the SEC for civil FCPA violations (whether anti-bribery violations or
books and records and internal control violations). Enforcement actions from 2014 fitting this
pattern include: Avon, Bio-Rad, HP, and Alcoa. The overlap, however, between the DOJ and SEC’s
FCPA enforcement programs is not complete. As a general matter, the SEC has jurisdiction over
“issuers” (companies – domestic and foreign – with shares registered on a U.S. exchange or
otherwise required to make filings with the SEC). In other words, the SEC generally does not have
jurisdiction over private companies or foreign companies that are not issuers. Thus, certain FCPA
enforcement actions from 2014, such as Alstom, Dallas Airmotive, and Marubeni did not have an
SEC component. As a general matter, the DOJ has criminal jurisdiction over “issuers,” “domestic
concerns,” (i.e. any business entity with a principal place of business in the U.S. or organized under
U.S. law), and non-U.S. companies and persons to the extent a bribery scheme involved conduct
“while in the territory of the U.S.” Id. at 11. In addition, the DOJ has a higher burden of proof in
a criminal prosecution. As a result, and given the DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion, certain FCPA
enforcement actions in 2014 such as Bruker, Layne Christensen, and Smith & Wesson only
included an SEC component. As to the DOJ’s discretion, the DOJ has stated that it “has declined
to prosecute both individuals and corporate entities in numerous cases based on the particular facts
and circumstances presented in those matters, taking into account the available evidence.” Id. at
75.
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C. Aggregate Corporate FCPA Enforcement
In 2014, the DOJ and SEC together collected approximately $1.6 billion in ten
core corporate enforcement actions. The average settlement amount was
approximately $159 million and the median was approximately $72 million. The
range of settlements was, on the high end, $772 million (Alstom), and on the low
end, $2 million (Smith & Wesson).
As in most years, certain FCPA enforcement actions significantly skewed 2014
FCPA enforcement statistics. For instance, one enforcement action (Alstom)
represented approximately 48% of the total settlement amount and two
enforcement actions (Alstom and Alcoa) represented approximately 72% of the
total settlement amount.
A popular issue, or so it seems, is to analyze whether FCPA enforcement is up
or down in any given year. Such year-to-year FCPA enforcement statistics, and
the arbitrary cutoffs associated with them, are of marginal value however given
that many non-substantive factors can influence the timing of an actual corporate
FCPA enforcement action.33
Nevertheless, and accepting year-to-year FCPA statistics for what they are, the
issue remains: how best to analyze and interpret FCPA statistics over time? As
demonstrated by the below tables, arguments can be made that corporate FCPA
enforcement was down and up in 2014 compared to 2013 and prior years.
The below tables use the “core” approach and demonstrate that both DOJ and
SEC corporate enforcement in 2013 were down from historical averages.34
Table III — Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010 – 2014)

33.

34.

150

Year

Core Actions

2014

7

2013

7

2012

9

Because FCPA enforcement actions that involve both a DOJ and SEC component are typically
announced on the same day, and because the DOJ and SEC are separate enforcement agencies, it
is common for FCPA enforcement actions to be delayed while one agency waits for the other to finish
its investigation of the conduct at issue and its negotiation of a resolution with a company.
Additional non-substantive factors that can influence the timing of an FCPA enforcement action,
although far from an exclusive list, include DOJ and SEC staffing issues (including employee
departures or leaves) as well as securing corporate board approval for resolving an FCPA
enforcement action. Id.
Corporate FCPA Enforcement was Down in 2013, Or Was it Up, Or Was it Down?, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/corporate-fcpa-enforcement-was-down-in-2013-orwas-it-up-or-was-it-down.
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Year

Core Actions

2011

11

2010

17

Table IV — Corporate SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010 – 2014)
Year

Core Actions

2014

7

2013

8

2012

8

2011

13

2010

19

However, if one analyzes corporate FCPA enforcement statistics based on
settlement amounts, corporate FCPA enforcement by the DOJ was up in 2014
compared to prior years. In fact, the $1.25 billion the DOJ collected in corporate
FCPA enforcement actions in 2014 set an all-time record.
Table V— Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts
(2010–2014)
Year

Settlement Amounts

2014

$1.25 billion

2013

$420 million

2012

$142 million

2011

$355 million

2010

$870 million

As highlighted in the below chart, while settlement amounts in corporate FCPA
enforcement actions by the SEC were up in 2014 compared to prior years, the
aggregate $327 million in corporate SEC FCPA settlements did not set an all-time
record similar to DOJ FCPA enforcement in 2014.
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Table VI — SEC FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts (2010 – 2014)
Year

Settlement Amounts

2014

$327 million

2013

$300 million

2012

$118 million

2011

$148 million

2010

$530 million

What is the best way to analyze and interpret these statistics? Consider the
following analogy. In year one, a city issues 100 speeding tickets and collects
$20,000 in fines on those tickets. In year two, a city issues ninety speeding tickets;
however, because certain drivers were going really fast, the city collects $25,000 in
fines on those tickets. Was there less enforcement in year two compared to year one?
It is assumed that most would say enforcement in year two was less than in year
one, even though the city collected more money from speeding tickets in year two.
The same logic applies to year-to-year FCPA statistics, and for this reason it is
more accurate and reliable to analyze FCPA enforcement statistics by focusing on
unique instances of FCPA scrutiny (and not settlement amounts) and tracking
enforcement actions using the “core” approach. Using this approach, corporate
FCPA enforcement in 2014 was down compared to historical averages, and indeed,
2014 saw the second lowest number of core enforcement actions since 2007.
This point is best demonstrated by the below table which aggregates DOJ and
SEC enforcement statistics over time and highlights notable circumstances which
significantly skewed enforcement data statistics in any particular year.
Table VII — Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007 – 2014)

152

Year

Core Actions

Settlement Amounts

Of Note

2007

15

$149 million

Six enforcement actions
involved Iraq Oil for Food
conduct; these enforcement
actions comprised 40% of
all enforcement actions
and approximately 50% of
the $149 million amount.
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Year

Core Actions

Settlement Amounts

Of Note

2008

10

$885 million

The $800 million Siemens
enforcement action
comprised approximately
90% of the $885 million
amount.

2009

11

$645 million

The $579 million KBR /
Halliburton Bonny Island,
Nigeria enforcement action
comprised approximately
90% of the $645 million
amount.

2010

21

$1.4 billion

Six enforcement actions,
all resolved on the same
day, involved various oil
and gas companies use of
Panalpina in Nigeria.
Panalpina also resolved an
enforcement action on the
same day.
Two enforcement actions
(Technip and Eni /
Snamprogetti) involved
Bonny Island conduct.
In other words, there were
fourteen unique corporate
enforcement actions in
2010. Of further note, the
two Bonny Island
enforcement actions,
Technip ($338 million) and
Eni/Snamprogetti ($365
million) comprised
approximately 50% of the
$1.4 billion amount.
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Year

Core Actions

Settlement Amounts

Of Note

2011

16

$503 million

The $219 million JGC
Corp. enforcement action
involved Bonny Island
conduct and comprised
approximately 44% of the
$503 million amount.

2012

12

$260 million

No enforcement actions
significantly skewed the
statistics.

2013

9

$720 million

The $398 million total
enforcement action
comprised approximately
55% of the $720 million
amount.

2014

10

$1.6 billion

Two enforcement actions
(Alstom - $772 million and
Alcoa - $384 million)
comprised approximately
72% of the $1.6 billion
amount.

TOTALS

104

$6.23 billion

D. Individual FCPA Enforcement
In 2014, the DOJ filed or announced FCPA criminal charges against ten
individuals as highlighted below.
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Table VII — 2014 DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions
Individual
Employer / Former
Related Corporate
Employer
Enforcement Action
Dmitry Firtash
Andras Knopp
Suren Gevorgyan
Gajendra Lal
Periyasamy
Sunderalingam35

Associated with DF
Group

No

Benito Chinea
Joseph DeMeneses36

Direct Access Partners

No

Joseph Sigelman
Knut Hammarskjold
Gregory Weisman37

PetroTiger Ltd.

No

In 2014, the SEC brought FCPA civil charges against two individuals as
highlighted below. The enforcement action was notable in that it was the first SEC
individual FCPA enforcement action since April 2012.38

35.

36.

37.

38.

In addition, K.V.P. Ramachandra Rao was also charged in the case, but not with FCPA offenses. See
Press Release, Six Defendants Indicted in Alleged Conspiracy to Bribe Government Officials in India
to Mine Titanium Minerals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sixdefendants-indicted-alleged-conspiracy-bribe-government-officials-india-mine-titanium
(last
updated Sept. 15, 2014)..
Press Release, CEO and Managing Partner of Wall Street Broker-Dealer Charged with Massive
International Bribery Scheme, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/ceo-and-managing-partner-wall-street-broker-dealer-charged-massive-international-bribery (last
updated Sept. 15, 2014).
Press Release, Foreign Bribery Charges Unsealed Against Former Chief Executive Officers of Oil
Services Company, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/foreignbribery-charges-unsealed-against-former-chief-executive-officers-oil-services-company
(last
updated Oct. 9, 2014).
“World Tour” for Saudi Officials Results in Individual SEC FCPA Enforcement Action, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/world-tour-for-saudi-officials-results-inindividual-sec-fcpa-enforcement-action.
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Table VIII — 2014 SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions
Individual
Employer / Former
Related Corporate
Employer
Enforcement Action
Stephen Timms and
Yasser Ramahi39

Associated with FLIR
Systems Inc.

No

The below tables provide a historical overview of DOJ and SEC individual FCPA
enforcement actions between 2007 and 2014.
Table IV — DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions40
Year
Individuals Charged With Criminal
FCPA Offenses
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007

10
12
2
10
33
(including 22 in the Africa Sting case)
18
14
7

Table X — SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions41

39.
40.
41.
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Year

Individuals Charged With Civil
FCPA Offenses

2014
2013
2012
2011

2
0
4
12

Press Release, SEC Sanctions Two Former Defense Contractor Employees for FCPA Violations, U.S.
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1370543472839#.VI9dwyvF91b.
A Focus on DOJ FCPA Individual Prosecutions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 20, 2014),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-doj-fcpa-individual-prosecutions-2.
A Focus on SEC FCPA Individual Prosecutions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 22, 2014),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-sec-fcpa-individual-actions-2.
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Year

Individuals Charged With Civil
FCPA Offenses

2010
2009
2008
2007

7
5
5
7

With a proper foundation in FCPA statistics, both in 2014 and over time, this
article next uses certain statistics and other information to highlight persistent and
problematic issues associated with FCPA enforcement.

II. Issues Highlighted by the Statistics
Part II of this article uses FCPA enforcement action data to highlight noteworthy
issues from 2014. Specifically, the following issues are discussed: (i) the wide
spectrum of FCPA allegations — from multi-million dollar payments in connection
with large infrastructure projects to $4 payments — and how the breadth of such
allegations send confusing compliance messages to those subject to the FCPA; (ii)
the wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement and a relevant
data point that helps explain the gap as well as the significant policy issues which
flow from the gap; and (iii) the problematic surge in SEC administrative actions to
resolve alleged instances of FCPA scrutiny.
A. The Wide Spectrum of FCPA Enforcement Actions
This section highlights the wide spectrum of FCPA allegations in 2014 and how
the breadth of such allegations send confusing compliance messages to those subject
to the FCPA.
At its relevant core, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions prohibit the offering or
providing of anything of value, to a “foreign official,” in order to “obtain or retain
business,” with corrupt intent.42 Against this statutory backdrop, the DOJ and SEC
have stated in connection with official FCPA Guidance that they are “focused on
bribes of consequence — ones that have a fundamentally corrosive effect on the way
companies do business abroad” and “payments of real and substantial value that
clearly represent an unambiguous intent to bribe a foreign official to obtain or retain
business.”43

42.
43.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1998).
The Guidance Press Conference, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
the-guidance-press-conference.
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Certain allegations in 2014 FCPA enforcement actions surely fit the type of
conduct that the enforcement agencies have articulated is the focus of their
respective FCPA enforcement programs. For instance, both the Alstom and
Marubeni enforcement actions concerned multi-million dollar alleged bribes to
alleged Indonesian foreign officials in connection with large infrastructure projects.44
Likewise, an enforcement action against an Alcoa entity concerned multi-million
dollar alleged bribes to alleged senior officials of the Kingdom of Bahrain in order to
obtain and retain a long-term alumina supply agreement.45
On the other hand, many allegations in various 2014 FCPA enforcement actions
seemed to run counter to the sensibly articulated focus of FCPA enforcement. For
instance, the SEC brought two enforcement actions based primarily on alleged
excessive travel and entertainment benefits provided to alleged “foreign officials.”
In an enforcement action against Bruker Corp., the SEC found that “from 2005
through 2011, the Bruker China Offices paid approximately $119,710 to fund 17
trips for Chinese government officials that were for the most part not related to any
legitimate business purpose.”46 Likewise, in an individual enforcement action, the
SEC found that former employees of FLIR Systems Inc. “arranged expensive travel,
entertainment, and personal items for foreign government officials in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia in order to influence the officials to obtain new business for
their employer . . . and to retain existing business for FLIR with the Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Interior.”47 In addition, the SEC’s enforcement action against Avon
included allegations concerning handbags, payments “for meals and entertainment
expenses under $200 per occurrence,” and use of “corporate boxes at the China Open
tennis tournament.”48
The monetary threshold of an alleged bribe was also lowered by the enforcement
agencies in 2014. Even though the Chief of the SEC’s Enforcement Division stated
in connection with official FCPA Guidance that one purpose of the Guidance was to

44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
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See Press Release, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve
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(last
updated Dec. 29, 2014); Press Release, Marubeni Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign
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Bruker Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 73835, 2014 WL 7016166 (Dec. 15, 2014).
Stephen Timms and Yasser Ramahi, Exchange Act Release No. 73616, 2014 WL 6338805 (Nov. 17,
2014).
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“clear up some myths about the type of conduct that gets prosecuted under the FCPA
— that it is not the $5 cup of coffee, or the one off $50 gift to a public official, that
companies need to be concerned about,” the SEC’s FCPA enforcement action against
Layne Christensen Company included an allegation about a $4 payment.49 In the
words of the SEC:
“Layne Christensen made more than $10,000 in small payments to
foreign officials through various customs and clearing agents that it
used in Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and the
[Democratic Republic of Congo]. These payments ranged from $4 to
$1,700 and were characterized in invoices submitted by the
agents as, among other things, “intervention,” “honoraires,”
“commissions,” and “service fees.”50
The above type of allegations were not unique to 2014, as other recent FCPA
enforcement actions have included allegations about: perfume, dresses and
handbags; a bottle of wine; a watch; a camera, kitchen appliances and business suits;
television sets, laptops and appliances; and tea sets and office furniture allegedly
provided to alleged foreign officials.51 Nevertheless, the 2014 allegations serve as a
reminder that the enforcement agencies continue to send confusing compliance
messages to those subject to the FCPA.
In addition to the enforcement agency policy statements highlighted above, the
FCPA Guidance states:
“Devoting a disproportionate amount of time policing modest
entertainment and gift-giving instead of focusing on large
government bids, questionable payments to third-party consultants,
or excessive discounts to resellers and distributors may indicate
that a company’s compliance program is ineffective. A $50 million
contract with a government agency in a high-risk country warrants
greater scrutiny than modest routine gifts and entertainment.”52
In connection with the FCPA Guidance, the SEC stated that it was “interested in
companies spending compliance dollars in the most sensible way” and hoped that
the Guidance and the hypotheticals provided in it would help companies decide
where they can “minimize investment and where they can maximize it.”53 The DOJ
similarly added that it wants compliance programs “to address real matters of
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Koehler, supra note 44.
Layne Christensen Co., Exchange Act Release No. 73437, 2014 WL 5423780 (Oct. 27, 2014).
Do Lanny Breuer And Robert Khuzami Actually Read FCPA Enforcement Actions?, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/do-lanny-breuer-and-robert-khuzamiactually-read-fcpa-enforcement-actions. (Containing links to original source documents).
A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND SEC. EXCH.
COMM. (2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf.
The Guidance Press Conference, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
the-guidance-press-conference.
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concern.”54
Because few business organizations subject to the FCPA have $50 million
contracts with government agencies in high-risk countries — or even any business
with government agencies — the end result of the above cursory and often nondeterminative allegations in many FCPA enforcement actions is to induce riskaverse business organizations to act contrary to the sensible enforcement agency
guidance and statements highlighted above.
In short, if the DOJ and SEC are genuine about their message that they are only
“focused on bribes of consequence,” on payments of “real and substantial value,” and
in companies spending compliance dollars in the “most sensible way,” there is
something very easy and practical for the enforcement agencies to do: only allege
conduct in an FCPA enforcement action that actually determines the ultimate
outcome of the enforcement action.
B. The Wide Gap Between Corporate and Individual FCPA
Enforcement
This section highlights the wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA
enforcement and a relevant data point that helps explain the gap, as well as the
significant policy issues which flow from the gap.
Key to achieving deterrence in the FCPA context is prosecuting individuals to the
extent the individual’s conduct legitimately satisfies the elements of an FCPA
violation. For a corporate employee with job duties that provide an opportunity to
violate the FCPA, it is easy to dismiss corporate money being used to pay settlement
amounts. On the other hand, it is not easy to dismiss hearing of an individual with
a similar background and job duties being criminally charged and sent to federal
prison for violating the FCPA.
The enforcement agencies have long recognized that an FCPA enforcement
program based solely on corporate fines is not effective and does not adequately deter
future FCPA violations.55
Such rhetoric continued in 2014 as the Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ’s
Criminal Division stated:
“Corporations do not act, but for the actions of individuals. In all
but a few cases, an individual or group of individuals is responsible
for the corporation’s criminal conduct. The prosecution of culpable

54.
55.
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individuals — including corporate executives — for their criminal
wrongdoing continues to be a high priority for the department.”56
Likewise, the Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division stated:
“[A]ctions against individuals have the largest deterrent impact.
Individual accountability is a powerful deterrent because people pay
attention and alter their conduct when they personally face
potential punishment. And so in the FCPA arena as well as all other
areas of our enforcement efforts, we are very focused on attempting
to bring cases against individuals.”57
However, as in prior years, the enforcement agencies rhetoric about individual
FCPA enforcement actions remains hollow and there is a wide gap between
corporate and individual FCPA enforcement actions.
As highlighted in Table I, of the seven DOJ corporate enforcement actions from
2014, six (86%) have not, at least yet, resulted in any related charges against
employees of the corporate entity resolving the enforcement action. Likewise, as
highlighted in Table II, of the seven SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions from
2014, seven (100%) have not, at least yet, resulted in any related charges against
employees of the corporate entity resolving the enforcement action.
The wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement actions in
2014 was not an anomaly. Indeed, since 2008 the DOJ has resolved sixty-seven
corporate FCPA enforcement actions and fifty (75%) have not, at least yet, resulted
in any DOJ charges against company employees.58 Similarly, since 2008 the SEC has
resolved seventy-two corporate FCPA enforcement actions and sixty (83%) have not, at least
yet, resulted in any SEC charges against company employees.59 The higher SEC
figure compared to the DOJ figure is notable in that the SEC, as a civil law
enforcement agency, has a lower burden of proof in an enforcement action.
To be sure, the DOJ and SEC have brought FCPA enforcement actions against
individuals. Indeed, as highlighted in Table VII, the DOJ did charge ten individuals
with FCPA violations in 2014. However, the DOJ individual actions followed a
typical “clustering” approach in which just three “core” actions resulted in the ten
individual prosecutions. Such an approach was consistent with prior years in that
56.
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Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the Criminal Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks by
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Leslie R. Caldwell at the 22nd Annual Ethics
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19,
2014),
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since 2008 the DOJ has charged ninety-nine individuals with criminal FCPA
offenses, yet 58% of the individuals have been in just five “core” actions and 78% of
the individuals have been in just eleven “core” actions.60 In other words, DOJ FCPA
individual enforcement numbers are significantly skewed by a small handful of
enforcement actions.
The same is true for SEC FCPA individual enforcement actions. As highlighted
in Table VIII and discussed above, for the first time since April 2012, the SEC
brought an individual FCPA enforcement action in November 2014. The two
individuals charged were in the same “core” action. Such an approach was
consistent with prior years in that since 2008 the SEC has charged thirty-five
individuals with civil FCPA offenses, yet 60% of the individuals have been in just
five “core” actions.61 In other words and like the DOJ statistics, SEC FCPA
individual enforcement numbers are significantly skewed by a small handful of
enforcement actions.
Against the backdrop of aggressive enforcement agency rhetoric about individual
prosecutions, the wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement
raises several significant legal and policy issues. For starters, it causes one to
legitimately wonder whether the conduct giving rise to the corporate FCPA
enforcement action was engaged in by ghosts. Indeed, others have rightly asked the
“but why was nobody charged” question in connection with many corporate FCPA
enforcement actions.62
However, an equally plausible reason why no individuals have been charged in
connection with most corporate FCPA enforcement actions may have to do with the
quality and legitimacy of the corporate enforcement action in the first place. As
highlighted in Table I, DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions are often resolved
through deferred prosecution agreements or non-prosecution agreements. Indeed,
since 2010, 86% of DOJ corporate FCPA enforcements actions have involved either
an NPA or DPA.63
NPAs and DPAs are not subject to any meaningful judicial scrutiny and are often
agreed to by business organizations for reasons of ease and efficiency, and not
necessarily because the conduct at issue violated the FCPA. Indeed, prior to
becoming SEC Chair, Mary Jo White stated a “fear [that] the deferred prosecution
[agreement] is becoming a vehicle to show results.”64 Likewise, former DOJ Attorney
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
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General Alberto Gonzales stated:
“It is ‘easy, much easier quite frankly’ for the DOJ to resolve
FCPA inquiries with NPAs and DPAs; such resolution vehicles have
‘less of a toll’ on the DOJ’s budget and such agreements ‘provide
revenue’ to the DOJ. It is all ‘unfortunate’ [Is this the end of the
sentence? Unclear from quotation placement.]
“In an ironic twist, the more that American companies elect to settle
and not force the DOJ to defend its aggressive interpretation of the
[FCPA], the more aggressive DOJ has become in its interpretation
of the law and its prosecution decisions.”65
Perhaps most telling, Mark Mendelsohn (former chief of the DOJ’s FCPA Unit),
has talked about the “danger” of NPAs and DPAs and how “it is tempting for the
[Justice Department] or the SEC . . . to seek to resolve cases through DPAs or NPAs
that don’t actually constitute violations of the law.”66
Individuals charged with FCPA violations, on the other hand, face a deprivation
of personal liberty, damage to their personal reputations, and personal financial
consequences and are thus more likely to force the DOJ to satisfy its high burden of
proof as to all FCPA elements. In other words, perhaps the more appropriate
question is not “but why was nobody charged” in connection with most corporate
FCPA enforcement actions, but rather do corporate NPAs and DPAs necessarily
represent provable FCPA violations?
The following working hypothesis seeks to assess this question:
•

•

Instances in which the DOJ brings actual criminal charges
against a company or otherwise insists in the resolution that the
corporate entity pleads guilty to FCPA violations, represent a
higher quality FCPA enforcement action (in the eyes of the
DOJ) and are thus more likely to result in related FCPA
criminal charges against company employees.
Instances in which the DOJ resolves an FCPA enforcement
action solely with an NPA or DPA, represent a lower quality
FCPA enforcement action and are thus less likely to result in
related FCPA criminal charges against company employees
given that an individual is more likely to put the DOJ to its high
burden of proof.

The below statistics provide a compelling data point concerning the quality and

65.
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legitimacy of many corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions. Since NPAs and
DPAs were first introduced to the FCPA context in December 2004, there have been
eighty-three corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.67
•

•

•

Fourteen of these corporate enforcement actions were the result
of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the
corporate entity to FCPA violations. Ten of these corporate
enforcement actions (71%) resulted in related criminal charges
of company employees.
Fifty-three of these corporate enforcement actions were resolved
solely with an NPA or DPA. In only five instances (9%) were
there related criminal charges of company employees.
A third type of corporate FCPA enforcement action is a hybrid
action in which the resolution includes a guilty plea by some
entity in the corporate family — usually a foreign subsidiary —
and an NPA or DPA against the parent company. Since
the introduction of NPAs and DPAs in the FCPA context there
have been sixteen such corporate enforcement actions. In five
of these actions (31%) there were related criminal charges of
company employees.

The “but why was nobody charged?” question is also tempting to ask in connection
with SEC FCPA enforcement given that 83% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions
since 2008 have not, at least yet, resulted in any SEC charges against company
employees. Yet, like with the DOJ figures, there may be an equally plausible reason
why so few individuals have been charged in connection with most corporate SEC
FCPA enforcement actions. The reason may have to do with the quality and
legitimacy of the corporate enforcement action in the first place.
With the SEC, the issue is not so much NPAs or DPAs (even though the SEC has
used such vehicles two times to resolve an FCPA enforcement action: a DPA with
Tenaris in 2011 and a NPA with Ralph Lauren in 2013, neither of which resulted in
any related charges against company employees). Rather, the issue seems to be
the SEC’s neither admit nor deny settlement policy, as well as the SEC’s increased
use of administrative actions (a topic discussed in greater detail in the next section).
Indeed, a notable development from 2014 was the Second Circuit concluding in a
non-FCPA case that challenged the SEC’s neither admit nor deny settlement policy
that SEC settlements are not necessarily about the truth, but pragmatism.68
Individuals in an SEC FCPA enforcement, even if only a civil action and even if
frequently allowed to settle on neither admit nor deny terms or through an
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administrative process, have their personal reputation and finances at stake and are
thus more likely than corporate entities to challenge the SEC and force it to satisfy
its burden of proof as to all FCPA elements.
As to the problematic surge in SEC administrative actions used to resolve alleged
instances of FCPA scrutiny discussed in greater detail below, it is worth highlighting
here that since 2013 the SEC has used administrative actions to resolve nine
corporate FCPA enforcement actions and in none of these actions have there been
related SEC enforcement actions against company employees.69 In other words, and
like in the DOJ context, perhaps the more appropriate question is not “but why was
nobody charged?” in connection with most SEC corporate FCPA enforcement
actions, but rather do SEC corporate FCPA settlements necessarily represent
provable FCPA violations?
The above statistics should prompt questions about the quality and legitimacy of
many corporate FCPA enforcement actions and may explain the wide gap between
corporate and individual FCPA enforcement. The wide gap between corporate and
individual enforcement, whether in the FCPA context or more broadly, raises
important legal and policy issues. Indeed, DOJ Attorney General Eric Holder stated
in 2014:
“[T]he [DOJ] recognizes the inherent value of bringing enforcement
actions against individuals, as opposed to simply the companies that
employ them. We believe that doing so is both important — and
appropriate — for several reasons:
First, it enhances accountability.
Despite the growing
jurisprudence that seeks to equate corporations with people,
corporate misconduct must necessarily be committed by flesh-andblood human beings. So wherever misconduct occurs within a
company, it is essential that we seek to identify the decision-makers
at the company who ought to be held responsible.
Second, it promotes fairness — because, when misconduct is the
work of a known bad actor, or a handful of known bad actors, it’s not
right for punishment to be borne exclusively by the company, its
employees, and its innocent shareholders.
And finally, it has a powerful deterrent effect. All other things being
equal, few things discourage criminal activity at a firm – or
incentivize changes in corporate behavior — like the prospect of
individual decision-makers being held accountable. A corporation
may enter a guilty plea and still see its stock price rise the next
day. But an individual who is found guilty of a serious fraud crime
is most likely going to prison.”70
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Yet despite the above rhetoric, the statistics highlighted in this section speak for
themselves and there is an undeniably wide gap between corporate and individual
FCPA enforcement.
C. The Problematic Surge in SEC Administrative Actions
Prior FCPA year in reviews focused on NPAs and DPAs and the controversy
associated with such alternative resolution vehicles.71 As highlighted in Table I,
such resolution vehicles continued to be a prominent fixture of FCPA enforcement
in 2014 and remain controversial. However, the more notable issue from 2014 was
the surge in SEC administrative actions to resolve alleged instances of FCPA
scrutiny.
Prior to discussing why this surge is problematic, some background information
is necessary. SEC administrative actions in the FCPA context were rare prior to
2010, largely because the SEC could not impose monetary penalties in such
proceedings absent certain exceptions not relevant to FCPA enforcement. However,
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act granted the SEC authority to impose civil
monetary penalties in administrative proceedings in which the SEC staff seeks a
cease-and-desist order.72
Of further historical relevance to the recent surge of the SEC resolving most
FCPA enforcement actions administratively, is that the SEC has had some notable
struggles in recent years in the FCPA context and otherwise when put to its burden
of proof in litigated actions or otherwise having to defend its settlement policies to
federal court judges.73 The SEC’s response to this judicial scrutiny has been, as
strange as it may sound, to bypass the judicial system altogether when resolving
many of its enforcement actions including in the FCPA context.
As noted by FCPA practitioners:
“The use of administrative proceedings is noteworthy in an
environment in which federal judges are increasingly questioning
the merits of proposed settlements submitted by the SEC and

71.
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defendants for approval. . . . As judicial review continues to inject
uncertainty into the once perfunctory settlement approval process,
the use of administrative proceedings to resolve FCPA violations
may become a preferred forum for SEC settlements.”74
Use of administrative proceedings have indeed become the SEC’s preferred forum
for resolving alleged instances of FCPA scrutiny. As Table II highlighted, of the
seven SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2014, six (86%) were resolved
through SEC administrative orders.
This surge in administrative proceedings is problematic. While Congress’s grant
of such authority to the SEC in 2010 was no doubt politically popular in the
aftermath of the so-called financial crisis, it has directly resulted in less judicial
scrutiny of SEC enforcement theories including in the FCPA context. In short, SEC
administrative actions, not to mention SEC NPAs and DPAs, place the SEC in the
role of regulator, prosecutor, judge and jury all at the same time.
Criticism of the SEC’s increased use of administrative proceedings grew in 2014.
For instance, Judge Jed Rakoff, a notable trial court judge who sits in the influential
Southern District of New York and long a critic of the SEC’s neither admit nor deny
settlement policy, questioned the SEC’s reliance on administrative proceedings by
rhetorically asking in an unrelated order “from where does the constitutional
warrant for such unchecked and unbalanced administrative power derive.”75
Judge Rakoff followed-up more forcefully in a speech in which he asked — “is the
SEC becoming a law unto itself?”76 In the speech Judge Rakoff discussed “some
dangers that seem to lurk . . . in the SEC’s apparent new policy of bringing a greater
percentage of its significant enforcement actions as administrative proceedings.”77
In the words of Judge Rakoff:
“What has been the stated rationale for all these changes? Usually
nothing more than a claim of greater efficiency.”
[…]
While a claim to greater efficiency by any federal bureaucracy
suggests a certain chutzpah, it is hard to find a better example of
what is sometimes disparagingly called “administrative creep” than
this expansion of the S.E.C.’s internal enforcement power.
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To be sure, an S.E.C. enforcement action brought internally is in
some superficial respects more “effective and efficient” and more
“streamlined” than a similar action brought in federal court, for the
simple reason that S.E.C. administrative proceedings involve much
more limited discovery than federal actions, with no provision
whatsoever for either depositions or interrogatories. Similarly, at
the hearing itself, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply and
the S.E.C. is free to introduce hearsay. Further still, there is no jury,
and the matter is decided by an administrative law judge appointed
and paid by the S.E.C. It is hardly surprising in these circumstances
that the S.E.C. won 100% of its internal administrative hearings in
the fiscal year ending September 30, 2014, whereas it won only 61%
of its trials in federal court during the same period.
But, although the informality and arguable unfairness of S.E.C.
administrative proceedings might present serious problems for
those defending such actions, you might suppose that federal judges
would be delighted to have fewer complicated securities cases
burdening their overcrowded dockets. The reason, though, that I
suggest that the judiciary and the public should be concerned about
any trend toward preferring the S.E.C.’s internal administrative
forum to the federal courts is that it hinders the balanced
development of the securities laws.”
In conclusion, Judge Rakoff stated:
“. . . I would urge the S.E.C. to consider that it is neither in its own
longterm interest, nor in the interest of the securities markets,
nor in the interest of the public as a whole, for the S.E.C. to become,
in effect, a law onto itself.”
Another vocal critic of the SEC’s increased use of administrative proceedings has
been Russell Ryan, a former Assistant Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division).
Ryan has noted:
“[A] surge in administrative [SEC] prosecutions should alarm
anyone who values jury trials, due process and the constitutional
separation of powers. The SEC often prefers to avoid judicial
oversight and exploit the convenience of punishing alleged
lawbreakers by administrative means, but doing so is
unconstitutional. And if courts allow the SEC to get away with it,
other executive-branch agencies are sure to follow.”78
The irony of the SEC’s increased use of resolution vehicles that bypass the judicial
system is that they have occurred during the tenure of Chair White. As SEC Chair,
White has extoled the virtue of trials and the adversarial system. For instance, in a
speech titled “The Importance of Trials to the Law and Public Accountability,” White
78.
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stated that trials “put our system of justice . . . on display for all to see” and observed:
“The public airing of facts, literally in open court, creates
accountability for both defendants and the government. How we
resolve disputes and how we decide the guilt or innocence of an
accused are the true measure of our democracy.”79
In the speech, White noted that trials are the “‘crown jewel’ of our system of
justice” and she focused on two “of the [more] important roles that trials play in our
administration of justice: how they foster development of the law, and perhaps even
more importantly how they create public accountability for both defendants and the
government through the public airing of charges and evidence.” As to the former,
White stated that “[t]rials allow for more thoughtful and nuanced interpretations of
the law in a way that settlements and summary judgments cannot.”80 As to the later,
White stated:
“The death of trials would . . . remove a source of disciplined
information about matters of public significance. . . . It would mean
the end of an irreplaceable public forum and would mean that more
of the legal order would proceed behind closed doors. And it would
deprive us, as American citizens, of an important source of
knowledge about ourselves and key issues of public concern.”81
Notwithstanding the lack of accountability and adverse effects on the
development of law that SEC Chair White has articulated, administrative actions
have clearly become the preferred way for the SEC to resolve alleged instances of
FCPA scrutiny. Indeed, the SEC has vowed increased use of administrative
proceedings to resolve FCPA enforcement actions82 and the SEC has generally
rebutted criticisms of such proceedings by stating that the SEC’s “use of the
administrative forum is eminently proper, appropriate, and fair to respondents.”83
Many disagree and 2014 witnessed the beginning of constitutional challenges to the
SEC’s use of the administrative process to resolve alleged violations of the securities
law, an issue that will likely come into clearer focus in the years ahead.84
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III.Other Top FCPA or Related Developments From 2014
Part III of this article highlights other top FCPA or related developments from
2014. Specifically, the following issues are discussed: (i) judicial scrutiny of FCPA
enforcement agency theories including the first case of precedent regarding the
FCPA’s important “foreign official” element; and (ii) judicial scrutiny of enforcement
theories related to FCPA enforcement and how non-FCPA legal developments
should cause pause as to certain FCPA enforcement theories.
A. Judicial Scrutiny of FCPA Enforcement Theories
Because of the resolution vehicles used by the DOJ and SEC to resolve FCPA
enforcement actions, there is very little judicial scrutiny of FCPA enforcement.
However, 2014 did witness two instances of judicial scrutiny and this section
provides a comprehensive analysis of a historic “foreign official” appellate court
decision as well as judicial scrutiny of a long-standing SEC enforcement action.
1.

“Foreign Official”

In the FCPA’s approximate forty-year history there have been few judicial
decisions of precedent. Indeed, the number of substantive FCPA appellate court
decisions can be counted on one hand.85 Thus, almost by definition, the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Esquenazi, a case of first impression regarding
the FCPA’s important “foreign official” element, was the top FCPA legal
development of 2014. Prior to discussing Esquenazi, some background information
is necessary.
At its relevant core, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions prohibit the offering or
providing of anything of value to a “foreign official” in order to “obtain or retain
business.”86 The FCPA defines “foreign official” as “any officer or employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a
public international organization.”87
The proper scope and meaning of the “foreign official” element is an issue of
extraordinary practical significance to businesses and individuals subject to the
FCPA. The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions prohibit certain business conduct with
“foreign officials,” but do not apply to conduct that does not involve a “foreign
official.” Thus, it would not violate the FCPA to offer or provide something of value
to a private customer, but offering or providing the same to a “foreign official” could

85.
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be a criminal FCPA violation. Consequently, drawing the line between individuals
who qualify as “foreign officials” and those who do not is critically important in a
wide range of international business transactions.
For most of the FCPA’s history the “foreign official” element presented little
controversy as FCPA enforcement largely focused on payments to bona fide “foreign
officials” such as political leaders and other foreign government regulatory officials
such as tax and customs officials.88 However, in this new era of FCPA enforcement,
the “foreign official” element has led to much dispute and controversy as many FCPA
enforcement actions have nothing to do with such recipient categories.
Rather, the alleged “foreign officials” in many FCPA enforcement actions are
employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises (“SOEs”). SOEs are
generally profit seeking enterprises that have many attributes of private business
such as publicly traded stock or other private investors. In addition, many SOEs do
business outside of their “home jurisdiction” in other countries and employ nationals
and non-nationals alike. Nevertheless, and not often transparent, a foreign
government may hold an ownership interest in an SOE or exert some level of control
(such as through appointment of directors or officers) over the business enterprise.
Many of the world’s largest companies (often in the oil and gas industry) are
considered SOEs and SOEs are found in most foreign countries and are most
prevalent in certain Asian countries and the Middle East.
The enforcement theory that has gained prominence is that SOEs are
“instrumentalities” of a foreign government and that employees of alleged SOEs are
thus “foreign officials” under the FCPA and occupy a status similar to political
leaders. For instance, in 2014, 60% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved,
in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs ranging from power and electric
companies, to hospitals and labs, to an oil and gas company, to an aluminum
smelter.89
Against this backdrop, in 2011 a federal jury criminally convicted Joel Esquenazi
and
Carlos
Rodriguez
(former
executives
of
Florida-based
Terra
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Telecommunications Corp. (“Terra”)) on various counts for their alleged roles in a
scheme to pay bribes to alleged “foreign officials” at Haiti Telecom, an alleged SOE.90
On appeal, defendants challenged, among other things, the trial court’s “foreign
official” jury instruction and an issue presented to the Eleventh Circuit was,
“[w]hether [defendants are] entitled to an acquittal because employees of Haiti
Teleco were not ‘foreign officials’ within the meaning of FCPA simply because the
National Bank of Haiti owned shares of Haiti Teleco and the Haitian government
appoints board members and directors.”91
The appeal was historic in that it represented the first time in FCPA history in
which an appellate court was presented the opportunity to scrutinize the prominent
enforcement theory that employees of alleged SOEs are “foreign officials” under the
FCPA. Because Esquenazi was a case of first impression, and given the previously
highlighted prominence of the SOE “foreign official” theory as well as the general
importance of the “foreign official” element of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, an
extended discussion of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is warranted.
After summarizing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirming the defendants’
conviction in which the court defined the term “instrumentality” in the FCPA, the
decision is next critically analyzed and the following issues will be discussed: (i) the
Eleventh Circuit’s flawed legal reasoning; (ii) the practical compliance difficulties of
applying the Eleventh Circuit’s “instrumentality” definition; and (iii) separating
what was at issue in the Eleventh Circuit appeal vs. what was not at issue.
To state the obvious, the Esquenazi decision was based on the unique facts of the
case and the specific question presented of whether Haiti Teleco employees were
“foreign officials” under the FCPA simply because the National Bank of Haiti
allegedly owned shares of Haiti Teleco and the Haitian government allegedly
appointed board members and directors.
As to the relevant factual background, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
One of Terra’s main vendors was [Haiti Teleco]. Because the
relationship of Teleco to the Haitian government was, and remains,
at issue in this case, the government presented evidence of Teleco’s
ties to Haiti. Former Teleco Director of International Relations
Robert Antoine testified that Teleco was owned by Haiti. An
insurance broker, John Marsha, testified that, when Messrs.
Rodriguez and Esquenazi were involved in previous contract
negotiations with Teleco, they sought political-risk insurance, a type
90.
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of coverage that applies only when a foreign government is party to
an agreement. In emails with Mr. Marsha copied to Messrs.
Esquenazi and Rodríguez, Mr. Dickey called Teleco an
“instrumentality” of the Haitian government.
An expert witness, Luis Gary Lissade, testified regarding Teleco’s
history. At Teleco’s formation in 1968, the Haitian government gave
the company a monopoly on telecommunication services. Teleco had
significant tax advantages and, at its inception, the government
appointed two members of Teleco’s board of directors. Haiti’s
President appointed Teleco’s Director General, its top position, by
an executive order that was also signed by the Haitian Prime
Minister, the minister of public works, and the minister of economy
and finance. In the early 1970s, the National Bank of Haiti gained
97 percent ownership of Teleco. From that time forward, the Haitian
President appointed all of Teleco’s board members. Sometime later,
the National Bank of Haiti split into two separate entities, one of
which was the Banque de la Republique d‘Haiti (BRH). BRH, the
central bank of Haiti, is roughly equivalent to the United States
Federal Reserve. BRH retained ownership of Teleco. In Mr.
Lissade’s expert opinion, for the years relevant to this case, Teleco
belonged “totally to the state” and “was considered . . . a public
entity.”
Mr. Lissade also testified that Teleco’s business entity suffix,
S.A.M., indicates “associate anonymous mixed,” which means the
“Government put money in the corporation.” Teleco’s suffix was
attached not by statute, but “de facto” because “the government
consider[ed] Teleco as its . . . entity.” In 1996, Haiti passed a
“modernization” law, seeking to privatize many public institutions.
As a result, Haiti privatized Teleco sometime between 2009 and
2010. Ultimately, Mr. Lissade opined that, during the years
relevant to this case, “Teleco was part of the public administration.”
He explained: “There was no specific law that . . . decided that at the
beginning that Teleco is a public entity but government, officials,
everyone consider[ed] Teleco as a public administration.” And, he
said, “if there was a doubt whatsoever, the [anti-corruption] law
[that] came in 2008 vanish[ed] completely this doubt . . . by citing
Teleco as a public administration” and by requiring its agents —
whom Mr. Lissade said were public agents — to declare all assets to
avoid secret bribes.92
Based on the above circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Haiti
Teleco “would qualify as a Haitian instrumentality under almost any definition [the
court] could craft,” and that the Haiti Teleco employees allegedly bribed were thus
“foreign officials” under the FCPA.93 Elsewhere, the court stated that it had “little
92.
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difficulty concluding sufficient evidence supported the jury’s necessary finding that
Teleco was a Haitian instrumentality.”94
The Eleventh Circuit could have rendered its decision on this narrow issue.
However, “mindful of the needs of both corporations and the government for [future]
direction about what an instrumentality is,”95 the Eleventh Circuit went further and
attempted to define “instrumentality” as found in the FCPA. For starters, the
Eleventh Circuit rightly acknowledged that:
“The FCPA does not define the term “instrumentality,” and this
Court has not either. For that matter, we know of no other court of
appeals who has.”96
The Eleventh Circuit’s statutory analysis next proceeded as follows:
“We begin, as we always do when construing statutory text, with the
plain meaning of the word at issue. According to Black’s Law
Dictionary, an instrumentality is ‘[a] means or agency through
which a function of another entity is accomplished, such as a branch
of a governing body.’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
says the word means ‘something that serves as an intermediary or
agent through which one or more functions of a controlling force are
carried out: a part, organ, or subsidiary branch esp. of a governing
body.’ These dictionary definitions foreclose Mr. Rodriguez’s
contention that only an actual part of the government would qualify
as an instrumentality—that contention is too cramped and would
impede the ‘wide net over foreign bribery’ Congress sought to cast
in enacting the FCPA.”97
The Eleventh Circuit next observed that “dictionary definitions” did not
completely provide the answer to what is an “instrumentality” and the court next
“turn[ed] to other tools to decide what ‘instrumentality’ means in the FCPA.”98 The
court stated:
“In the FCPA, the company ‘instrumentality’ keeps is ‘agency’ and
‘department,’ entities through which the government performs its
functions and that are controlled by the government. We therefore
glean from that context that an entity must be under the control or
dominion of the government to qualify as an ‘instrumentality’
within the FCPA’s meaning. And we can also surmise from the other
words in the series along with ‘instrumentality’ that an
instrumentality must be doing the business of the government.
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What the defendants and the government disagree about, however,
is what functions count as the government’s business.
To answer that question, we examine the broader statutory context
in which the word is used. In this respect, we find one other
provision of the FCPA and Congress’s relatively recent amendment
of the statute particularly illustrative. First, the so-called ‘grease
payment’ provision establishes an ‘exception’ to FCPA liability for
‘any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official . . . the
purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a
routine governmental action by a foreign official.’ ‘Routine
governmental action’ is defined as ‘an action . . . ordinarily and
commonly performed by a foreign official in,’ among other things,
‘providing phone service.’ If an entity involved in providing phone
service could never be a foreign official so as to fall under the FCPA’s
substantive prohibition, there would be no need to provide an
express exclusion for payments to such an entity. In other words, if
we read ‘instrumentality,’ as the defendants urge, to categorically
exclude government-controlled entities that provide telephone
service, like Teleco, then we would render meaningless a portion of
the definition of ‘routine governmental action.’ […] ‘It is a cardinal
rule of statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if
possible, be accorded to every word.’ Thus, that a governmentcontrolled entity provides a commercial service does not
automatically mean it is not an instrumentality. In fact, the statute
expressly contemplates that in some instances it would.
Next, we turn to Congress’s 1998 amendment of the FCPA, enacted
to ensure the United States was in compliance with its treaty
obligations. That year, the United States ratified the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions (OECD Convention). In joining the OECD
Convention, the United States agreed to ‘take such measures as
may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under
[United States] law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or
give . . . directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official
. . . in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to
the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain
business or other improper advantage in the conduct of
international business.’ ‘Foreign public official’ is defined to include
‘any person exercising a public function for a foreign country,
including for a . . . public enterprise.’ The commentaries to the
OECD Convention explain that: ‘A “public enterprise” is any
enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over which a government, or
governments, may, directly or indirectly, exercise a dominant
influence.’ The commentary further explains: ‘An official of a public
enterprise shall be deemed to perform a public function unless the
enterprise operates on a normal commercial basis in the relevant
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market, i.e., on a basis which is substantially equivalent to that of a
private enterprise, without preferential subsidies or other
privileges.’ In addition to this, the OECD Convention also requires
signatories make it a crime to pay bribes to agents of any ‘public
international organization.’
To implement the Convention’s mandates, Congress amended the
FCPA in 1998. The only change to the definition of ‘foreign official’
in the FCPA that Congress thought necessary was the addition of
‘public international organization.’ This seems to demonstrate that
Congress considered its preexisting definition already to cover a
‘foreign public official’ of an ‘enterprise . . . over which a government
. . . exercise[s] a dominant influence’ that performs a ‘public function’
because it does not ‘operate[] on a normal commercial basis . . .
substantially equivalent to that of . . . private enterprise[s]’ in the
relevant market ‘without preferential subsidies or other privileges.’
Although we generally are wary of relying too much on later
legislative developments to decide a prior Congress’ legislative
intent, the circumstances in this case cause us less concern in that
regard. This is not an instance in which Congress merely discussed
previously enacted legislation and possible changes to it. Rather,
Congress did make a change to the FCPA, and it did so specifically
to ensure that the FCPA fulfilled the promise the United States
made to other nations when it joined the Convention. The FCPA
after those amendments is a different law, and we may consider
Congress’s intent in passing those amendments as strongly
suggestive of the meaning of “instrumentality” as it exists today.
[…]
[S]ince the beginning of the republic, the Supreme Court has
explained that construing federal statutes in such a way to ensure
the United States is in compliance with the international
obligations it voluntarily has undertaken is of paramount
importance. ‘If the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of
international accords and have a role as a trusted partner in
multilateral endeavors, its courts should be most cautious before
interpreting its domestic legislation in such manner as to violate
international agreements.’ We are thus constrained to interpret
‘instrumentality’ under the FCPA so as to reach the types of officials
the United States agreed to stop domestic interests from bribing
when it ratified the OECD Convention.”99
Based on the above analysis and rationale, the Eleventh Circuit articulated the
below key language from the decision.
“An ‘instrumentality’ [under the FCPA] is an entity controlled by
the government of a foreign country that performs a function the
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controlling government treats as its own. Certainly, what
constitutes control and what constitutes a function the government
treats as its own are fact-bound questions. It would be unwise and
likely impossible to exhaustively answer them in the abstract.
Because we only have this case before us, we do not purport to list
all of the factors that might prove relevant to deciding whether an
entity is an instrumentality of a foreign government. For today, we
provide a list of some factors that may be relevant to deciding the
issue.
To decide if the government ‘controls’ an entity, courts and juries
should look to the foreign government’s formal designation of that
entity; whether the government has a majority interest in the
entity; the government’s ability to hire and fire the entity’s
principals; the extent to which the entity’s profits, if any, go directly
into the governmental fisc, and, by the same token, the extent to
which the government funds the entity if it fails to break even; and
the length of time these indicia have existed.
[…]
We then turn to the second element relevant to deciding if an entity
is an instrumentality of a foreign government under the FCPA —
deciding if the entity performs a function the government treats as
its own. Courts and juries should examine whether the entity has a
monopoly over the function it exists to carry out; whether the
government subsidizes the costs associated with the entity
providing services; whether the entity provides services to the public
at large in the foreign country; and whether the public and the
government of that foreign country generally perceive the entity to
be performing a governmental function.”100
With a comprehensive summary of the Esquenazi decision complete, a critical
analysis of the decision of first impression is next warranted and the following issues
are discussed: (i) the Eleventh Circuit’s flawed legal reasoning; (ii) the practical
compliance difficulties of applying the Eleventh Circuit’s “instrumentality”
definition; and (iii) separating what was at issue in the Eleventh Circuit appeal vs.
what was not at issue.
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Flawed Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision was flawed in at least two respects.101 First,
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contrary to the court’s opinion, the FCPA’s enacting legislative history indicates that
Congress did not intend the term “foreign official” to include employees of SOEs.
Second, instead of considering the relevant enacting FCPA legislative history, the
Eleventh Circuit supported its conclusion with a flawed analysis of subsequent 1998
amendments to the FCPA.
As to the first flaw in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the FCPA’s extensive
enacting legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend the “foreign
official” element to include employees of SOEs. Enacted in 1977, the FCPA was the
end result of more than two years of investigation and consideration by both the
94th and 95th Congresses of the so-called “foreign corporate payments problem.”
Between June 1975 and September 1977, approximately twenty different bills were
introduced in the Senate or House to address the foreign payments issue, and
Congress held numerous hearings during which representatives from DOJ, SEC,
State Department, Defense Department, Commerce Department, and Treasury
Department testified.102
During its investigation and consideration of the foreign payments issue,
Congress learned of a wide variety of payments to a broad range of recipients.103 But
instead of enacting a general anti-bribery statute that would have applied to
payments made to both public officials and private parties, Congress chose to enact
a more limited law and accepted that the FCPA would “not reach all corrupt
payments overseas.”104 In short, Congress used the “foreign official” element of the
FCPA to limit the reach of the statute and if an alleged payment scheme does not
involve a “foreign official,” no violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions can
occur.
Statements, events, and information in the legislative history indicate Congress’s
intent to exclude employees of SOEs from the definition of “foreign official.” For
instance, the payments that prompted Congressional scrutiny principally involved
traditional foreign government officials such as the Prime Minister of Japan; the
Inspector General of the Dutch Armed Forces; the husband of the Queen of the
Netherlands; the President of Honduras; the President of Gabon; and Saudi Arabian
military generals.105 It was these types of payments — and the foreign policy issues
102.
103.
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they created — that motivated Congress to pass the FCPA in 1977.106
During its multi-year investigation and deliberation, Congress clearly was aware
that SOEs existed and that some of the foreign payments may have involved
employees of such enterprises. Indeed, some of the bills introduced to address the
foreign payments issue in the Senate and the House during both the 94th and 95th
Congresses included definitions of “foreign government” that expressly included
SOEs.
However, none of those bills became law. For instance, in August 1976, S. 3741
was introduced in the Senate, and H.R. 15149 was introduced in the House. Both
bills defined “foreign government” to include, among other things, “a corporation or
other legal entity established or owned by, and subject to control by, a foreign
government.”107 Similarly, in June 1977, H.R. 7543 was introduced in the House and
defined “foreign government” to include “a corporation or other legal entity
established, owned, or subject to managerial control by a foreign government.”108 The
above-quoted language from S. 3741 and H.R. 15149 provoked a comment from an
American Bar Association (“ABA”) committee, which informed Congress that the
definition of “foreign government” in these bills was “somewhat ambiguous.”109 The
ABA committee suggested a “more precise definition of this aspect of the definition
of ‘foreign government’” and proposed the following language: “a legal entity which
a foreign government owns or controls as though an owner.”110
Even though Congress was obviously aware of SOEs and even though language
in other bills addressing foreign payments expressly included SOEs, Congress chose
not to include these definitions or concepts in the bill that ultimately became the
FCPA in December 1977. In short, in enacting the FCPA, Congress specifically
contemplated — but rejected — statutory language that would have included SOEs.
Indeed, by rejecting the definitions that appeared in S. 3741 and H.R. 15149,
Congress rejected the very ownership-and-control test the Eleventh Circuit
articulated in Esquenazi to determine when individuals employed by SOEs may be

106.

107.
108.
109.
110.

Contributions to Foreign Governments Hearings”); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Economic Policy, H.R., 94th Congr., 1st Sess. (June 5, July 17, 24, & 29, Sept. 11, 18, & 30, 1975).
See, e.g., Political Contributions to Foreign Governments Hearings at 1 (“This subcommittee is
concerned with the foreign policy consequences of these payments by U.S. based multinational
corporations. . . . It is time to treat the issue for what it is: a serious foreign policy problem.”);
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, House of Representatives, 94th Congress,
2nd Sess. at 139 (Sept. 21 & 22, 1976) (“Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearing…problem with
corporate bribery overseas is that it poses very significant problems for our own foreign policy”).
S. 3741, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 6, 1976); H.R. 15149, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (Aug. 10, 1976).
H.R. 7543,,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 1, 1977).
H.R. 15149, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. Foreign Payments Disclosure Hearings (containing a Sept. 22,
1976 letter from the American Bar Association to Rep. John Murphy, Chairman of the House
Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Fin.).
Id.
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considered “foreign officials” under the FCPA.
The second flaw in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision was that instead of considering
the relevant enacting FCPA legislative history, the court supported its conclusion
with a flawed analysis of subsequent 1998 amendments to the FCPA.
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that it was “wary of relying too much on later
legislative developments to decide a prior Congress’ legislative intent” and
specifically cited a prior Supreme Court warning that “the views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”111
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the legislative history of the
1998 amendments to the FCPA—passed more than twenty years after enactment of
the FCPA—to determine the meaning of critical terms that have always appeared
in the FCPA. Even assuming post-enactment legislative history could theoretically
be relevant to the issue presented in Esquenazi, the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on
the 1998 amendments was nevertheless flawed in at least two respects.
First, the 1998 amendments did not modify or address the component of the
FCPA’s definition of “foreign official” at issue in the case. Prior to the FCPA’s 1998
amendments, the FCPA defined “foreign official” in pertinent part as:
“[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person
acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government
or department, agency, or instrumentality . . .”112
The 1998 amendments to the FCPA modified that definition as follows:
“any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on
behalf of any such government or department, agency, or
instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international
organization.”113
As highlighted by the italicized text, the FCPA’s 1998 amendments added
unrelated language to make it clear that public international organizations were
within the FCPA’s scope. The amendments did not modify the “foreign official”
definition in any way that was relevant to the question presented to the Eleventh
Circuit.
Second, the Eleventh Circuit erroneously concluded that the FCPA’s 1998
amendments fully conformed the FCPA to the OECD Convention. Having so
concluded, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the FCPA’s “foreign official” element
111.
112.
113.
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Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912 (citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1418.
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, § 3, 112 Stat.
3302, 3305 (emphasis added).
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must include employees of SOEs because the OECD Convention’s “foreign public
official” definition can include employees of a “public enterprise” under certain
circumstances.114
However, the 1998 Amendments to the FCPA were not intended to and did not
bring the FCPA into complete conformity with the OECD Convention. When it
passed the 1998 amendments, Congress understood that, while the OECD
Convention approximated the FCPA, the two were not identical. During
Congressional hearings that led to the 1998 amendments, the OECD Convention
was described as “closely model[ing]” the FCPA, being “very similar” to the FCPA;
being “largely consistent” with the FCPA; and tracking the FCPA closely.115 None of
those statements demonstrate Congress’s intent to establish complete conformity
between the OECD Convention and the FCPA.
Regardless of Congress’s intent, as the Fifth Circuit previously stated in an
unrelated FCPA decision, the OECD Convention and the FCPA, as modified by the
1998 amendments, remain different in significant respects.116
The erroneous assumption of equivalence between the OECD Convention and the
FCPA is a critical flaw in the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis. Based on that false
premise, the court inferred that Congress “considered its preexisting definition [of
‘foreign official’] already to cover” employees of SOEs. After all, the Eleventh Circuit
reasoned, if the 1998 amendments were designed to conform the FCPA to the OECD
Convention, and if the 1998 amendments did not modify the relevant portions of the
definition of “foreign official,” then the definition of “foreign official” must have
already conformed to the OECD Convention definition.
However, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning finds support in neither the FCPA’s
enacting legislative history, the legislative history relevant to the 1998
amendments, nor accepted norms of statutory construction. Indeed, the Supreme
114.

115.
116.

The OECD Convention’s inclusion of “public enterprise” in the definition of “foreign public official”
is specifically qualified through Commentary 15 to the OECD Convention, which states, “An official
of a public enterprise shall be deemed to perform a public function unless the enterprise operates
on a normal commercial basis in the relevant market, i.e., on a basis which is substantially
equivalent to that of a private enterprise, without preferential subsidies or other privileges.”
OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions cmt. 15, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, 9. [hereinafter OECD Combating Bribery
Convention]
The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 4353 Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. And Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 5, 10-11
(1998).
See Kay, 359 F.3d at 754. For instance: (i) while the FCPA contains an express statutory exception
for facilitating payments, the OECD Convention does not; (ii) while the FCPA prohibits certain
corrupt payments to political parties, the OECD Convention does not; and (iii) while the FCPA
requires that corrupt payments be for the purpose of “obtain[ing] or retain[ing] business,” the OECD
Convention contains no such requirement. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(b), -2(a) (1998), with the
OECD Combating Bribery Convention, supra note 115.
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Court has warned against divining legislative intent from Congress’s inaction.117
Furthermore, international agreements like the OECD Convention— which is not
self-executing—may be given legal effect only insofar as Congress separately enacts
legislation to implement them.118
In short, the scope of a key element of a top-priority federal criminal statute that
applies to countless businesses and individuals engaged in international commerce
should be determined by ordinary tools of statutory construction and not, as the
Eleventh Circuit did, through a flawed legal analysis or a process of inference based
on mistaken assumptions about a non-self-executing international agreement.
The above features of the Eleventh Circuit’s Esquenazi decision were problematic
itself, yet another problem with the court’s “instrumentality” definition is the
practical compliance difficulties that will result.
2. The Practical Compliance Difficulties of Applying the Eleventh Circuit’s “Instrumentality” Definition

To review, the key holding of the Esquenazi decision was that an
“instrumentality” under the FCPA is an “entity controlled by the government of a
foreign country that performs a function the controlling government treats as its
own.”119 The Eleventh Circuit recognized that what “constitutes control and what
constitutes a function the government treats as its own are fact-bound questions”
and, without seeking to list all “factors that might prove relevant,” the court did list
“some factors that may be relevant” in deciding issues of control and function.120
As to control, the Eleventh Circuit listed the following factors:
[T]he foreign government’s formal designation of that entity;
whether the government has a majority interest in the entity; the
government’s ability to hire and fire the entity’s principals; the
extent to which the entity’s profits, if any, go directly into the
governmental fisc, and, by the same token, the extent to which the
government funds the entity if it fails to break even; and the length
of time these indicia have existed.121
As to function:
[W]hether the entity has a monopoly over the function it exists to
carry out; whether the government subsidizes the costs associated
with the entity providing services; whether the entity provides
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002).
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 (2013) (a convention that is not self-executing “does
not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law” absent “implementing legislation
passed by Congress” (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008))).
Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 925.
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services to the public at large in the foreign country; and whether
the public and the government of that foreign country generally
perceive the entity to be performing a governmental function.122
The Eleventh Circuit’s non-exhaustive and often vague factors as to the meaning
of “instrumentality” present practical compliance difficulties for business
organizations and individuals competing in good faith in the global marketplace. In
short, those subject to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions will have difficulty in
finding answers to many of the factor-based questions.
The Eleventh Circuit apparently thought such answers would be easy to ascertain
and stated:
We think it will be relatively easy to decide what functions a
government treats as its own in the present tense by resort to
objective factors, like control, exclusivity, governmental authority to
hire and fire, subsidization, and whether an entity’s finances are
treated as part of the public fisc. Both courts and businesses subject
to the FCPA have readily at hand the tools to conduct that inquiry
(especially because the statute contains a mechanism by which the
Attorney General will render opinions on requests about what
foreign entities constitute instrumentalities [the so-called FCPA
Opinion Procedure Release Program].123
Once again however, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning was flawed. It is difficult
to envision how a general counsel or chief compliance officer of a company, charged
with approving expenditures of things of value made in connection with a business
purpose, will find answers to certain issues identified by the Eleventh Circuit as
being relevant.
Does the Eleventh Circuit envision the following exchanges?
•

•

•

General Counsel / Chief Compliance Officer: Pardon me
individual at Company A, can you tell me how your principals
are hired and fired?
General Counsel / Chief Compliance Officer: Excuse me
individual at Company B, but do your profits go directly into the
government fisc?
Does the government subsidize your
operations? And if so, for how long?
General Counsel / Chief Compliance Officer: By the way
individual at Company C, does the public in your country
generally perceive your company to be performing a
governmental function?

As to the practical compliance challenges resulting from the Eleventh Circuit’s
“instrumentality” definition, FCPA practitioners have noted:
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 925 n.8.
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In practice, this analysis may be more difficult than the court allows
because information on these factors is not always publicly available
or easy to discern.124
The boundaries between public and private entities are often
blurred, particularly in developing countries where corruption risks
are the target of heightened Justice Department scrutiny.125
As companies long have known, it can be expensive and time
consuming to make such determinations, particularly in countries
such as Russia, China, and various countries in Central and Latin
America and in Africa where information about companies and state
ownership is less than transparent and objective.126
Ten years ago, I would have been happy to bet anyone a doughnut
that I could accurately define what a foreign official is. Now, with
various court definitions and a lack of clarity from the DOJ, I fear I
might actually lose my doughnut.127
An irony of the Eleventh Circuit’s non-exhaustive, factor-based test for what
constitutes an “instrumentality” under the FCPA is that the court itself recognized
that it will be a “difficult task—involving divining the subjective intentions of a
foreign sovereign, parsing history, and interpreting significant amounts of foreign
law—to decide what functions a foreign government considers core and
traditional.”128 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit recognized “there may be entities
near the definitional line for ‘instrumentality’ that may raise a vagueness
concern.”129
A further irony of the Eleventh Circuit’s factor-based test which resorts to foreign
government categorization and characterization of business enterprises is that the
DOJ itself has rejected such an approach in issuing opinions under the FCPA
Opinion Procedure Release Program. For instance, in Release 94-01 a company
subject to the FCPA disclosed that its “foreign attorney has advised that under the

124.
125.
126.

127.

128.
129.
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M. Witten et al., Eleventh Circuit Adopts Broad Definition of Government “Instrumentality” Under
FCPA, WILMER HALE (May 22, 2014), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnews
detail.aspx?NewsPubId=17179872427.
Wendy Wysong et al., Eleventh Circuit Issues Much Anticipated Opinion Defining ‘Foreign Official’
Under FCPA, CLIFFORD CHANCE 1, 3 (May 20, 2014), http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2014/
05/eleventh_circuitissuesmuchanticipatedopinio.html#.U30GwfldWiM.
Sean Hecker et al., FCPA Update: U.S. Appellate Court Defines Government “Instrumentality”
Under FCPA, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP 1, 7 (May 2014), http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/
files/insights/publications/2014/05/fcpa%20update/files/view%20fcpa%20update/fileattachment/fcp
a_update_may2014.pdf.
Tom Webb, FCPA Enforcement Critic to Become DoJ Fraud Section Chief, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS
REVIEW (Jan. 13, 2015), http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/2277/?utm_source=
Law+Business+Research&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=5232111_GIR+Headlines&utm_
content=$LINK_KEYWORD$&dm_i=1KSF,3454F,E9U8QV,B628O,1.
Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 925, n.8.
Id. at 929.
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nation’s law, the individual [at issue] would not be regarded as either a government
employee or a public official . . . .”130 However, the DOJ stated that “the foreign
attorney’s opinion is not dispositive” and the DOJ “considered the foreign individual
to be a ‘foreign official’ under the [FCPA].”131
As to the FCPA’s Opinion Procedure Release Program referenced by the Eleventh
Circuit, seemingly lost on the court is that it often takes months for a business
organization to receive an answer from the DOJ. For this reason, among others, the
FCPA Opinion Procedure Release Program has been routinely criticized. As noted
in a 2010 review of FCPA enforcement by the OECD Working Group on Bribery in
International Business Transactions:
So far, the FCPA Opinion Procedure has been used very little by the
private sector to obtain DOJ advice on prospective transactions . . .
The non-governmental participants in the on-site meetings cited
several reasons for the infrequent use of the Opinion Procedure. For
instance, legal and private sector representatives felt that the
Opinion Procedure is only useful in limited situations where the
prospective fact situation is narrow and not going to change. They
also find that the response time, which is 30 days after the request
is complete, is too long in certain situations, such as entering joint
ventures and mergers and acquisitions, where a company normally
needs to make decisions relatively quickly . . . The most pervasive
concern of the private sector representatives was that availing
themselves of the Opinion Procedure could expose them to potential
enforcement actions by the DOJ, as well as provide competitors with
information about their prospective international business
activities.132
In short, the Eleventh Circuit’s non-exhaustive and often vague factors as to the
meaning of “instrumentality” present practical compliance difficulties for business
organizations and individuals competing in good faith in the global marketplace.
Moreover, as even the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged, its factor-based test may
raise constitutional vagueness questions. Indeed, by largely deferring to foreign
government categorization and characterization of business enterprises, the
Eleventh Circuit crafted an “instrumentality” definition with 193 potential different
meanings.133

130.
131.
132.
133.

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review: Opinion Procedure Release, No. 94-01, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE
(May
13,
1994),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
opinion/1994/9401.pdf.
Id.
Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the United States,
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 29 (Oct. 2010),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf.
By most measures, there are 193 countries in the world.
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Such a test as to a key element of an important criminal law raises several
significant constitutional issues “because it vests domestic federal lawmaking in
foreign governments and their officials.”134 Among other practical problems for those
subject to the FCPA is that finding foreign law may be difficult, and foreign
government agencies or departments may have rulemaking power but may not
publish rules in English.135
In closing, the Eleventh Circuit’s Esquenazi decision of first impression regarding
the FCPA’s important “foreign official” element was the top legal development of
2014. Yet, for the reasons discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit’s legal reasoning
was flawed and its non-exhaustive, factor- based test presents several practical
compliance difficulties.
Some commentators appeared perplexed why the meaning of “foreign official” in
the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions even matters. As stated by one commentator:
If your [sic] trying to figure out whether a company is a private
company or an “instrumentality” of a foreign government under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act you are already in trouble. To reach
that point in the FCPA analysis you’ve already paid a bribe, or are
thinking of paying a bribe. (If you’re just thinking about it; Don’t do
it.) Otherwise you’ll end up in the position of Joel Esquenazi and
Carlos Rodriguez.136
Such comments are entirely off-base and not the main reason why the meaning
of “foreign official” matters. To be sure, the meaning of “foreign official” mattered to
Esquenazi and Rodriguez in the narrow context of their case and more broadly for
the obvious rule of law reasons implicated in criminal law enforcement.
Stating that the meaning of “foreign official” matters only to those intent on
engaging in bribery is like saying the drinking laws matter only to those intent on
drunk driving. Sure, the drinking laws can certainly capture those engaged in drunk
driving, yet the reality is the underlying activity—drinking—is legal and socially
acceptable in most other situations.
The same is true when it comes to the meaning of “foreign official.” The FCPA’s
anti-bribery provisions are generally implicated when anything of value is offered or
provided to a “foreign official” in connection with a business purpose. Often the
underlying activity—offering or providing anything of value in connection with a
business purpose—is legal and socially acceptable in most situations. In fact, it is
often called effective sales and marketing, wining and dining the customer, or
134.
135.
136.
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maintaining good will. In other words, those competing in good faith in the global
marketplace can legally provide anything of value to one category of person in
connection with a business purpose, yet providing the same thing of value to a
different category of person can be a crime.
In short, the Esquenazi decision expands regulation of business interactions with
a “well-defined group of persons” (as correctly noted by the Fifth Circuit in U.S. v.
Castle137) to an ill-defined, practically boundless category of persons. Finally, in
analyzing Esquenazi it is also important to understand what was not at issue before
the Eleventh Circuit and what was at issue.
3. What Was At Issue in the Eleventh Circuit Appeal vs. What Was Not at
Issue

What was not at issue in Esquenazi was whether the FCPA should incorporate
SOE concepts. Indeed, if Congress wants to include SOEs in the FCPA, as it has in
other laws passed before and after the FCPA, or wants to align the FCPA with the
OECD Convention on the “foreign official” issue, Congress is clearly capable of doing
just that.
Both before and after enactment of the FCPA, Congress has demonstrated its
ability to draft and enact bills that expressly address SOEs and related concepts and
it is axiomatic that when a particular term is explicitly included in other statutes,
but is not included in the statute at issue, courts should presume that Congress did
not intend to include that term in the statute at issue.138
Congress has repeatedly enacted statutory definitions that expressly include
SOEs, but the definition included in the FCPA does not. Under such circumstances,
the absence of any mention of SOEs in the FCPA indicates Congress’s intent that
employees of SOEs do not fall within the FCPA’s definition of “foreign official.”
Indeed, if the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the FCPA’s statutory language
were correct, the express references to SOEs that appear in other statutes would be
rendered entirely superfluous.
For instance, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) passed by Congress
in 1976 (one year before the FCPA) expressly provides the following definition:
(a) “foreign state” . . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in
subsection (b).

137.
138.

See, e.g., United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 836 (5th Cir. 1991). The Castle court’s statement
was dicta and the court did not substantively address the meaning of the FCPA’s “foreign official”
element.
See, e.g., Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005).
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(b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” means any
entity—(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,
and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3)
which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . . nor
created under the laws of any third country.”139
Likewise, the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”) passed by Congress in 1996
regulates certain conduct that “will benefit any foreign government, foreign
instrumentality, or foreign agent” and expressly provides the following definition:
“[F]oreign instrumentality” means any agency, bureau, ministry,
component, institution, association, or any legal, commercial, or
business organization, corporation, firm, or entity that is
substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, commanded, managed,
or dominated by a foreign government.140
Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”), passed by Congress in 2010, required certain resource extraction
companies to disclose information regarding payments for development of oil,
natural gas, or minerals made to “foreign governments.” The law expressly includes
the following definition of “foreign government”:
[T]he term “foreign government” means a foreign government, a
department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government, or
a company owned by a foreign government, as determined by the
Commission.141
The quoted language of the above statutes, which expressly includes SOEs, would
be rendered surplusage if the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the FCPA were
correct. Of course, courts hesitate to adopt constructions of statutes that render
language unnecessary or inoperative and it is a “well-settled rule that all parts of a
statute, if possible, are to be given effect,”142 and courts are “reluctant to treat
statutory terms as surplusage in any setting.”143
What was also not at issue in Esquenazi was whether the FCPA should be a
comprehensive anti-bribery statute. Congress could have passed a comprehensive
anti-bribery statute in 1977—as well as when the FCPA was amended in 1988 and
1998—and could still pass a comprehensive anti-bribery statute today if it chooses.
However, it is undisputed that Congress has not done so and the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions are qualified in many ways such as through the category of recipients of
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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the alleged improper payments.
Indeed, should it choose, Congress could easily look to anti-corruption legislation
enacted by several other OECD Convention signatory countries which expressly
include SOEs and related concepts. For instance, the United Kingdom “Bribery Act”
defines “foreign public official” to expressly include individuals who exercise a public
function for any “public enterprise.”144 Similarly, Canada’s “Corruption of Foreign
Public Officials Act” defines “foreign public official” to expressly include a person
who performs public duties or functions for a foreign state, including a person
employed by a “corporation.”145 Likewise, the relevant provisions of Australia’s
Criminal Code Act expressly state that “foreign government body” includes “a
foreign public enterprise,” and the Act then contains a detailed definition of “foreign
public enterprise.”146
What was at issue in Esquenazi was the basic and fundamental principle of
ensuring that when the government marshals its full resources against individuals
and deprives the individuals of their liberty, each element of the charge alleged is
being applied consistent with Congressional intent in enacting the statute. After
all, the DOJ (and SEC) should only enforce an FCPA statute that Congress actually
intended to enact.
Notwithstanding what was at issue in Esquenazi, some have suggested:
For those who challenged the government’s legal interpretation of
the term “instrumentality,” they need to pick and choose better
places to challenge the FCPA and the government’s enforcement
program.147
Such commentary wholly discounts the ultimate outcome of other FCPA
enforcement actions in which other individual defendants challenged, at the trial
court level, the DOJ’s legal interpretation that SOE employees were “foreign
officials” under the FCPA. For instance:
•

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

A federal court judge granted, at the close of the DOJ’s case,
John O’Shea’s motion for acquittal and found him not guilty of
all substantive FCPA charges.148 O’Shea’s lawyers opined that

Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, art. 6 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/
contents (emphasis added).
Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c 34, art 2 (Can.), available at http://lawslois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-45.2/page-1.html (emphasis added).
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) div 70 (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/
C2014C00196 (emphasis added).
Michael Volkov, Esquenazi: DOJ Wins Appeal on Instrumentality, VOLKOV LAW GROUP LLC (May
19, 2014), http://blog.volkovlaw.com/2014/05/esquenazi-doj-wins-appeal-on-instrumentality/.
O’Shea Not Guilty of Substantive FCPA Charges, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 17, 2012),
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•

•

the “foreign official” issue played a role in the ultimate outcome
of the case.149
In the Carson “foreign official” challenge, the judge issued a prodefendant jury instruction prior to trial concerning “knowledge
of status of foreign official.”150 Soon thereafter, the DOJ offered
the defendants what can only be described as lenient plea deals
that the risk adverse defendants accepted and the DOJ never
had to prove its case.151
In the Lindsey Manufacturing enforcement action, the judge
ultimately dismissed the case after finding numerous instances
of prosecutorial misconduct.152 Although the prosecutorial
misconduct was seemingly unconnected to “foreign official”
issues, post-trial motions concerning “foreign official” issues
were pending at the time of dismissal.

Given the dearth of FCPA precedent and the importance of the “foreign official”
issue, the Esquenazi decision generated much commentary. In the minds of some,
the decision of first impression “puts to rest a major issue of contention” concerning
the proper meaning of “foreign official.”153 Others stated that the Esquenazi decision
“would appear to curtail the on-going debate over what constitutes a government
instrumentality and whether improper payments to state-owned entities could be a
violation of the FCPA.”154
Such commentary is curious as it is doubtful that there is another instance in
which a key element of an important federal law is deemed resolved or settled
because of one appellate court decision, not to mention a flawed decision.
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4. Long-Standing SEC Enforcement Action

While not an appellate court decision, another notable instance of judicial
scrutiny of FCPA enforcement in 2014 was the conclusion of the SEC’s long-standing
FCPA enforcement action against Mark Jackson and James Ruehlen. By way of
background, in 2012 the SEC charged Jackson (a former CEO of Noble Corporation,
an oil and gas company) and Ruehlen (a current Director and Division Manager of
a Noble subsidiary in Nigeria) with authorizing a customs agent to make payments
on the company’s behalf “to Nigerian government officials to influence or induce
them to (1) favorably process false paperwork, (2) grant temporary import permits
(TIPs) [for oil rigs] based on the false paperwork, and (3) favorably exercise or abuse
their discretion in granting extensions to these illicit TIPs.”155
Jackson and Ruehlen mounted a defense and forced the SEC to prove its case, an
occurrence which rarely happens in the FCPA context.156 For approximately two
years there was much legal wrangling as the trial court judge granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss the SEC’s claims that sought monetary damages
while denying the motion to dismiss as to claims seeking injunctive relief. Even
though the court granted the motion as to the SEC’s monetary damage claims, the
dismissal was without prejudice and the SEC was allowed to file an amended
complaint. That is indeed what happened, and leading up to trial the SEC’s case
was consistently trimmed as the SEC attempted to meet its burden. Among other
things, a portion of the SEC’s claims were dismissed or abandoned on statute of
limitations grounds and the trial court judge ruled, in an issue of first impression,
that the SEC has the burden of negating the FCPA’s facilitation payments exception
to the anti-bribery provisions.157
Leading up to trial, the judge denied the parties’ motions for summary judgment,
and in denying the SEC’s motion the judge expressed much skepticism regarding
the validity of the SEC’s claims.158 Among other things, the judge questioned the
155.
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SEC’s ability to negate the facilitation payments exception and expressed concern
about the SEC’s position that the defendants violated the FCPA’s books and records
provisions because Noble Corp. booked the alleged improper payments in a special
facilitating payments account based on the good faith belief that they were indeed
facilitating payments.159
On the brink of the SEC’s first-ever FCPA trial, the parties agreed to settle.
Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, the defendants, who were not
required to pay any civil fine or other monetary sanction, consented to a final
judgment permanently restraining and enjoining them from violating the FCPA’s
books and records provisions.160
Even though the SEC’s FCPA Unit Chief called the resolution “a very good
settlement” for the SEC, the fact is on the brink of the SEC’s first-ever FCPA trial,
the SEC offered the defendants an extremely favorable settlement in what can only
objectively be called a defense win.161
B. Judicial Scrutiny of Related Enforcement Theories
Given the general absence of substantive FCPA case law, one must often
reference non-FCPA case law involving similar issues to best appreciate the many
controversial aspects of FCPA enforcement. In 2014, two Supreme Court decisions
and an appellate court decision touched upon issues relevant to FCPA enforcement.
1.

Supreme Court Decisions

Even though the Supreme Court declined cert. in Esquenazi, the general issue of
corruption was on the Supreme Court’s docket in 2014. In McCutcheon v. FEC, the
specific issue before the court was whether the aggregate limits on campaign
contributions, which restrict how much money a donor may contribute in total to all
political candidates or political committees, violated the First Amendment.162
In a plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices
Scalia, Kennedy and Alito, the court held that such aggregate limits are valid under
the First Amendment and in doing so dismissed the argument that such limits
served the objective of combating corruption. The opinion recognized that “while
preventing corruption or its appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may
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target only a specific type of corruption ‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”163 As to that type
of corruption, the plurality opinion adopted a narrow view and
stated: “[G]overnment regulation may not target the general gratitude a candidate
may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the political access such
support may afford. Ingratiation and access are not corruption.”164
The plurality opinion further stated:
[S]pending large sums of money in connection with elections, but
not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an
officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo
corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends
large sums may garner influence over or access to elected officials
or political parties.
The line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may
seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order
to safeguard basic First Amendment rights.165
A dissenting opinion authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor and Kagan stated that the notion “that large aggregate contributions do
not ‘give rise’ to ‘corruption’—is plausible only because the plurality defines
‘corruption’ too narrowly.”166
The dissenting opinion viewed corruption more broadly and stated:
Corruption breaks the constitutionally necessary chain of
communication between the people and their representatives. It
derails the essential speech-to-government-action tie. Where
enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be
heard. Insofar as corruption cuts the link between political thought
and political action, a free marketplace of political ideas loses its
point.
Since the kinds of corruption that can destroy the link between
public opinion and governmental action extend well beyond those
the plurality describes, the plurality’s notion of corruption is flatly
inconsistent with [basic constitutional rationales].167
It is difficult to square the reasoning of the plurality opinion in McCutcheon with
various aspects of FCPA enforcement. Corruption ought to be corruption, plain and
simple and the same rules and principles governing corruption of a “foreign official”
under the FCPA ought to apply to corruption of U.S. “officials.” Yet, as highlighted
by McCutcheon there appears to be a double standard. Against the backdrop of the
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U.S. government bringing FCPA enforcement actions based on allegations that a
company was seeking access to certain foreign officials or certain information or that
company employees were seeking to ingratiate themselves with foreign officials
through providing such items of value as a bottle of wine, flowers, karaoke bars or
cigarettes—just remember, in the words of the Supreme Court, “ingratiation and
access are not corruption.”
The McCutcheon decision was not the only Supreme Court decision from 2014
that touched upon issues relevant to FCPA enforcement. In Daimler A.G. v.
Bauman, the Supreme Court sharply criticized an agency theory that has seemingly
served as the basis for several corporate FCPA enforcement actions.
Prior to discussing the Bauman case it is useful to highlight certain background
information. If one digs into certain corporate FCPA enforcement actions it would
appear that legal liability seems to hop, skip, and jump around a multinational
company. This of course would be inconceivable in other areas of law, such as
contract liability or tort liability, absent an “alter ego” / “piercing the veil” analysis
for the simple reason that this is what the black letter law commands.
However, with increasing frequency, the DOJ and SEC have advanced broad
“agency” theories in which the acts of a subsidiary are attributed to a parent
corporation absent any allegations to support an “alter ego” or “veil piercing”
exception.168 Philip Urofsky (a former high-ranking DOJ FCPA enforcement
attorney) has been one of the more forceful critics of this trend and he rightfully
noted:
[J]ust because a corporate FCPA enforcement action is
resolved through an NPA rather than a DPA (or a guilty plea) does
not excuse this approach—when the DOJ announces it will not
prosecute but requires the company to admit to facts establishing
a criminal violation of the law, it is stating, as a fact, that the
company committed a crime. In such case, it is obligated to
demonstrate, through the pleadings, in whatever form they are
presented, that it could, in fact, prove each and every element of the
offense.169
It is against this relevant backdrop that the Supreme Court decided Bauman, to
determine “the authority of a court in the United States to entertain a claim brought
by foreign plaintiffs against a foreign defendant based on events occurring entirely
outside the United States.”170 Specifically, the complaint “alleged that during
168.
169.
170.
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Argentina’s 1976-1983 ‘Dirty War,’ Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary, MercedesBenz Argentina (MB Argentina) collaborated with state security forces to kidnap,
detain, torture, and kill certain MB Argentina workers, among them, plaintiffs or
persons closely related to plaintiffs.” Damages for the alleged human rights
violations were sought from Daimler, and U.S. jurisdiction “over the lawsuit was
predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), a
subsidiary of Daimler incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business
in New Jersey.”171
“The question presented,” as described by the Supreme Court, was “whether the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment preclude[d] the District Court
from exercising jurisdiction over Daimler . . . given the absence of any California
connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims described in the complaint.”172
As noted by the court, the plaintiffs were seeking to hold “Daimler vicariously liable
for MB Argentina’s alleged malfeasance” and it was noted that “MB Argentina was
a subsidiary wholly owned by Daimler’s predecessor in interest.”173
The Supreme Court’s decision was heavy on jurisdiction issues—including much
discussion of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction—but as to the agency issue
the court noted that “while plaintiffs ultimately persuaded the Ninth Circuit to
impute MBUSA’s California contacts to Daimler on an agency theory, at no point,
have they maintained that MBUSA is an alter ego of Daimler.”174
The Court then stated:
In sustaining the exercise of general jurisdiction over Daimler, the
Ninth Circuit relied on an agency theory, determining that MBUSA
acted as Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional purposes and then
attributing MBUSA’s California contacts to Daimler. The Ninth
Circuit’s agency analysis derived from Circuit precedent considering
principally whether the subsidiary “performs services that are
sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not
have a representative to perform them, the corporation’s own
officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services.
This Court has not yet addressed whether a foreign corporation may
be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts
of its in-state subsidiary. Daimler argues, and several Courts of
Appeals have held, that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can be
imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by the
latter as to be its alter ego. The Ninth Circuit adopted a less
rigorous test based on what it described as an “agency” relationship.
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Agencies, we note, come in many sizes and shapes: “One may be an
agent for some business purposes and not others so that the fact that
one may be an agent for one purpose does not make him or her an
agent for every purpose.” A subsidiary, for example, might be its
parent’s agent for claims arising in the place where the subsidiary
operates, yet not its agent regarding claims arising elsewhere. The
Court of Appeals did not advert to that prospect. But we need not
pass judgment on invocation of an agency theory in the context of
general jurisdiction, for in no event can the appeals court’s analysis
be sustained.
The Ninth Circuit’s agency finding rested primarily on its
observation that MBUSA’s services were “important” to Daimler, as
gauged by Daimler’s hypothetical readiness to perform those
services itself if MBUSA did not exist. Formulated this way, the
inquiry into importance stacks the deck, for it will always yield a
pro-jurisdiction answer: “Anything a corporation does through an
independent contractor, subsidiary, or distributor is presumably
something that the corporation would do ‘by other means’ if the
independent contractor, subsidiary, or distributor did not exist.”
The Ninth Circuit’s agency theory thus appears to subject foreign
corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state
subsidiary or affiliate . .. .
....
It was therefore error for the Ninth Circuit to conclude that Daimler,
even with MBUSA’s contacts attributed to it, was at home in
California, and hence subject to suit there on claims by foreign
plaintiffs having nothing to do with anything that occurred or had
its principal impact in California.175
Applying the verbiage in Bauman to the FCPA context, the notion that because a
subsidiary’s services are important to a parent corporation—and thus the subsidiary
is an agent of the parent corporation for purposes of imputing liability—stacks the
deck, for it will always yield a pro-agency answer.
The Bauman decision is also relevant to FCPA enforcement for another reason.
In the Supreme Court’s 2013 Kiobel decision (a non-FCPA case, but a case in which
the logic and rationale of many justices had direct bearing on certain aspects of
FCPA enforcement and indeed can be viewed as disapproval of certain aspects of
FCPA enforcement), the court expressed concern about the “delicate field of
international relations” of expansive U.S. jurisdiction over foreign actors.176
Continuing with this concern, in Bauman the Supreme Court stated:
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[T]he transnational context of this dispute bears attention . . . . The
Ninth Circuit . . . paid little heed to the risks to international comity
its expansive view of general jurisdiction posed. Other nations do
not share the uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction
advanced by the Court of Appeals in this case.
....
The Solicitor General informs us . . . that “‘foreign governments’
objections to some domestic courts’ expansive views of general
jurisdiction have in the past impeded negotiations of international
agreements on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of
judgments.” . . . Considerations of international rapport thus
reinforce our determination that subjecting Daimler to the general
jurisdiction of courts in California would not accord with the “fair
play and substantial justice” due process demands.177
It is nothing short of remarkable that the U.S. government urged restraint of
expansive jurisdictional theories in Daimler because such “unpredictable
applications” of expansive jurisdiction “could discourage foreign investors” and
result in other foreign policy difficulties, while at the same time advancing
unpredictable, creative, and dubious jurisdictional theories against foreign actors in
FCPA enforcement actions.178
For instance:
•

•

•
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An FCPA enforcement action against French company Total
S.A. (the third largest in FCPA history in terms of fine and
penalty amount) was based on a single wire transfer
(representing less than 1% of the alleged bribe payments at
issue to Iranian officials) from a New York based account.179
An FCPA enforcement action against Japan-based JGC Corp.
was based on the jurisdictional theory that certain alleged bribe
payments to Nigerian officials flowed through U.S. bank
accounts and that co-conspirators faxed or e-mailed information
into the U.S. in furtherance of the bribery scheme.180
An FCPA enforcement action against Hungary-based Magyar
Telekom was based on allegations that a company executive
sent two e-mails to a Macedonian foreign official from his U.S.
based e-mail address that passed through, was stored on, and
transmitted from servers located in the U.S. and that certain
electronic communications made in furtherance of the alleged
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•

2.

bribery scheme and the concealment of payments, including
drafts of certain agreements and copies of certain contracts with
intermediaries, were transmitted by company employees and
others through U.S. interstate commerce or stored on computer
servers located in the U.S.181
An FCPA enforcement action against Luxembourg-based
Tenaris was based on allegations that a payment to an agent in
connection with the alleged bribery scheme of an Uzbekistan
official was wired through an intermediary bank located in New
York.182
Appellate Court Decision

An appellate court decisions from 2014 also touched upon FCPA issues,
specifically whether the FCPA contains a private right of action.
3.

Private Right of Action

No doubt relevant to the Supreme Court’s decision not to hear the Esquenazi case
was that the issue presented was one of first impression that had not percolated in
the appellate courts. A reason for the dearth of substantive FCPA case law is
because certain appellate courts have held that there is no private right of action
under the FCPA.183 Therefore, DOJ and SEC enforcement actions present the only
conceivable opportunities for judicial examination of the FCPA, yet as highlighted
elsewhere in this article, most DOJ and SEC enforcement actions involve resolution
vehicles that are not subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny.
In 2014, the Second Circuit concluded—consistent with prior appellate court
decisions—that there is no private right of action under the FCPA.184 The Second
181.
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Circuit stated:
[P]rivate rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by
Congress.” A federal statute may create a private right of action
either expressly or, more rarely, by implication. In considering
whether a statute confers an implied private right of action, “[t]he
judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to
determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private
right but also a private remedy.” To discern Congress’s intent, “we
look first to the text and structure of the statute.” To “illuminate”
this analysis, we also consider factors enumerated in Cort v. Ash,
which include the following:
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted, . . . –that is, does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy
or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? In our analysis, we are mindful that “the Supreme Court
has come to view the implication of private remedies in regulatory
statutes with increasing disfavor.
....
The antibribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit certain entities and
persons from, inter alia, corruptly making payments to foreign
officials for the purpose of influencing official action in order to
obtain business. The text of the statute contains no explicit
provision for a private right of action, although it does provide for
civil and criminal penalties, and permits the Attorney General to
seek injunctive relief. Because “[t]he express provision of one
method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress
intended to preclude others,” the structure of the statute, by
focusing on public enforcement, tends to indicate the absence of a
private remedy.
The Cort v. Ash factors also do not support recognition of a private
right. The statute’s prohibitions focus on the regulated entities; the
FCPA contains no language expressing solicitude for those who
might be victimized by acts of bribery, or for any particular class of
persons. “Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than
the individuals protected create no implication of an intent to confer
rights on a particular class of persons.”
Nor does the legislative history of the FCPA demonstrate an
intention on the part of Congress to create a private right of action.
. . . [A] bill introduced by Senator Church in the 94th Congress
included an express right of action for competitors of those who
bribed foreign officials, that provision, however, was deleted by a
committee of the Senate.
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In the 95th Congress, which finally enacted the FCPA, a committee
of the House of Representatives, in reporting out a bill that did not
provide expressly for a private right of action, made a statement
that the House “Committee intends that the courts shall recognize
a private cause of action based on this legislation . . . on behalf of
persons who suffer injury as a result of prohibited corporate
bribery.” We have three main problems with the [Plaintiff’s]
reliance on this statement, and other aspects of the FCPA’s
legislative history, as justification for judicial implication of a
private right of action in its favor.
First, the House committee’s statement was not repeated (and no
endorsement of its substance was in any way suggested) in the
reports of either the Senate committee considering the FCPA or the
conference committee that reconciled the views of the House and
Senate to produce the language of the FCPA as it was ultimately
enacted. Indeed, in the debate on the conference committee report,
one conferee stated that the question of whether “courts will
recognize [an] implied private right of action . . . was not
considered in the Senate or during the conference, and thus [it]
cannot be said that any intent is expressed at all on this issue.”
Second, although the legislative history contains additional
references to the desirability of a private right of action, they do not
provide any clear indication of congressional intent to create one.
Third, we note that this case illustrates the wisdom of Lamb, which
avoids the question of what class of parties the FCPA was designed
to protect. Although we agree that the statute was primarily
designed to protect the integrity of American foreign policy and
domestic markets,” one might argue that it is principally the foreign
governments whose processes might be corrupted. The [Plaintiff’s]
claim highlights the obvious problem with the latter concern
here: The foreign government supposedly to be “protect[ed]” by the
FCPA was the entity that demanded the bribes in the first place.
Finally, we note that although it has been nearly a quarter of a
century since Lamb was decided, and although Congress has more
recently amended the FCPA Congress has not chosen to override
Lamb. We conclude that there is no private right of action under
the antibribery provisions of the FCPA . . . .185
As indicated in the Second Circuit’s decision, there have been previous appellate
court decisions addressing whether the FCPA has a private right of
action. However, in Lamb the primary reason articulated by the Sixth Circuit for
declining a private right of action was something that never happened – at least
until 2012 when the DOJ/SEC issued FCPA Guidance. The Sixth Circuit stated:
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Recognition of the plaintiffs’ proposed private right of action, in our
view, would directly contravene the carefully tailored FCPA scheme
presently in place. Congress recently expanded the Attorney
General’s responsibilities to include facilitating compliance with the
FCPA. Specifically, the Attorney General must “establish a
procedure to provide responses to specific inquiries” by issuers of
securities and other domestic concerns regarding “conformance of
their conduct with the Department of Justice’s [FCPA] enforcement
policy . . . .” Moreover, the Attorney General must furnish “timely
guidance concerning the Department of Justice’s [FCPA]
enforcement policy . . . to potential exporters and small businesses
that are unable to obtain specialized counsel on issues pertaining to
[FCPA] provisions.” Because this legislative action clearly evinces
a preference for compliance in lieu of prosecution, the introduction
of private plaintiffs interested solely in post-violation enforcement,
rather than pre-violation compliance, most assuredly would hinder
congressional efforts to protect companies and their employees
concerned about FCPA liability.186
Prior to Lamb, the Fifth Circuit addressed a private right of action, albeit in dicta,
in McLean v. Int’l Harvester Co. in which the court stated: “[W]e find it
inappropriate to imply a private cause of action from the statute. The statute on its
face shows no congressional intent to create a private action. Moreover, no legislative
history exists referring to such an intent.”187 This last observation by the Fifth
Circuit was obviously false given the legislative history discussed by the Second
Circuit in Republic of Iraq.
In short, the three appellate court decisions that address an FCPA private right
of action are either: (1) based on a false premise (McLean); (2) based on a false
premise at the time (Lamb); or (3) involved a unique and odd plaintiff (Republic of
Iraq).
An FCPA private right of action does warrant further consideration.188 For
starters, courts have inferred private rights of action in many other provisions of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“‘34 Act”)189 and the FCPA is after all part of
the ‘34 Act.
Moreover, contrary to the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Republic of Iraq, several
of the Cort v. Ash factors for implying a private of right would seem to be met in the
FCPA context. Among the reasons Congress passed the FCPA was to level the
playing field given how the discovered foreign corporate payments distorted free and
186.
187.
188.
189.

Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1029-30 (internal citations omitted).
McLean, 817 F.2d at 1219.
Indeed several bills have been introduced in Congress seeking to amend the FCPA to include a
limited private right of action. See FCPA Reform Bill Introduced (But Not That One), FCPA
PROFESSOR, http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-reform-bill-introduced-but-not-that-one.
See, e.g., J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-32 (1964).
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fair competition.190 Moreover, the SEC itself has stated on numerous occasions that
FCPA enforcement is central to its mission of investor protection.191 An FCPA
private right of action would further seem to be consistent with the underlying
premise of the FCPA which is to reduce foreign bribery.192 Finally, “regulation of
bribery directed at foreign officials cannot be characterized as a matter traditionally
relegated to state control,” as even the Lamb court recognized.193
At the very least, if there was an FCPA private right of action there would be
substantially more case law of precedent concerning the FCPA’s provisions than
currently exists.

Conclusion
This article provides a snapshot of FCPA and related developments from 2014
with the goal of providing value to anyone who seeks an informed based of
knowledge regarding the FCPA and related legal and policy issues. The FCPA is
one of the most important laws governing business conduct in the global
marketplace as it affects all businesses and individuals engaged in international
commerce. For this reason, and whether the specific issue is:
•
•

•
•
•

FCPA enforcement statistics;
The wide spectrum of FCPA enforcement actions and how the
breadth of such actions sends confusing compliance messages to
those subject to the FCPA;
The wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA
enforcement and the policy issues which flow from the gap;
The problematic surge in SEC administrative actions to resolve
alleged instance of FCPA scrutiny; or
Judicial scrutiny of FCPA enforcement theories or those
otherwise relevant to FCPA enforcement

The FCPA snapshot depicted in this article matters.

190.
191.
192.
193.
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Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 975 (2012).
See Investor Bulletin: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act – Prohibition of the Payment of Bribes to
Foreign Officials, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 2011), available at https://www.sec.gov/
investor/alerts/fcpa.pdf.
Id.
Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1030.

